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The Substance of Montgomery Retroactivity: The
Definition of States’ Supremacy Clause Obligation to
Enforce Newly Recognized Federal Rights in Their
Post-Conviction Proceedings and Why it Matters
Eric M. Freedman*
ABSTRACT
In Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S.Ct. 718 (2016), the Supreme Court
made a decision of far-reaching importance to the criminal justice
system: The Supremacy Clause requires states adjudicating postconviction attacks to give full retroactive effect to “substantive” new
rules of federal constitutional law.
The significance of this holding has so far been under-appreciated
because of the assumption that “substantive” has the same narrow
meaning in the context of the state’s obligations under the Supremacy
Clause as it does under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), which sets
forth prudential limitations on the claims that the federal courts will
entertain when adjudicating federal habeas corpus attacks on state
criminal convictions.
But, this article argues, the two contexts are not the same and the
assumption is unwarranted. To be sure, rules that are “substantive”
under Teague are also substantive under Montgomery. But because
Montgomery is based on the Supremacy Clause, the class of
“substantive” federal rules for Montgomery purposes should be far
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broader than it is for Teague purposes.
“Substantive” rules under Montgomery, I propose, include all those
whose policy underpinnings extend beyond enhancing the factual
accuracy of particular decisions. Examples of such rules are ones whose
aims include discountenancing government misconduct (e.g., barring
evidence derived from coerced confessions or unreasonable searches)
and achieving full community participation in the judicial process (e.g.,
adding new groups to the ones that may not constitutionally be excluded
from jury service, and expanding the categories of juror bias that a
defendant must be permitted to litigate).
Adopting the proposed definition will have structural benefits to the
system of criminal justice adjudication. The Montgomery decision will
necessarily have the effect of increasing the number of state postconviction decisions. The broader the definition of “substantive” the
more pronounced the effect. The more pronounced the effect the better
off the criminal justice system will be, for two reasons. First, state postconviction decisions will to some extent be able to fill the gap in the
common law creation of new rules by lower federal courts that has
resulted from the restrictive ruling in Teague. Second, the greater the
salience of post-conviction decisions, the greater the pressure on the
states to improve the quality of their post-conviction systems.
Thus, in the interests of making modest but real improvements in the
quality of our criminal law, lawyers, legislators, academics, judges, and
all individuals concerned about justice should seek adoption of the
proposal of this article.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Overview
In Montgomery v. Louisiana1 the Court held, following its adoption of a new
constitutional rule of criminal law,2 that the states’ flexibility to craft doctrines
limiting the retroactivity of new rules in state post-conviction proceedings is
subject to a constraint derived from the Supremacy Clause.3 The states must give
1

Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016).

2
The rule in question had been announced in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012)
(holding unconstitutional the imposition of mandatory life without parole sentences on juveniles). See
infra Part II (providing fuller description of case); see also infra text accompanying notes 107–09
(noting continuing division over reach of Miller).
3
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States . . . shall
be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”) (discussed infra Part III.C).
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full retroactive effect to new rules of federal constitutional law which are
“substantive.”4
4
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 731–32. The logic of Montgomery does not apply to, and this
article does not discuss, state court opinions in criminal cases construing their own constitutional
guarantees more broadly than the corresponding federal right, see, e.g., Gardner v. App. Division of
Sup. Ct., 436 P.3d 946, 1008 (Cal. 2019) (holding indigent misdemeanor defendant entitled by
California Constitution to appointed counsel on appeal of suppression order); State v. Santiago, 122
A. 3d 1, 140 (Conn. 2015) (holding death penalty violates ban on cruel and unusual punishments of
state constitution); State v. Lilly, 930 N.W.2d 293, 307–08 (Iowa 2019) (holding Iowa Constitution
forbids routine jury management practices whose effect is underrepresentation of minority groups);
People v. Bridgeforth, 69 N.E. 611, 614 (N.Y. 2016) (holding prosecutor’s use of peremptory strikes
on basis of skin color as opposed to race forbidden by New York Constitution); Commonwealth v.
Alexander, 243 A.3d 177, 181 (Pa. 2020) (holding state constitution provides greater protection than
Fourth Amendment against automobile searches); State v. Gregory, 427 P.3d 621, 627, 631–32
(Wash. 2018) (holding that the “death penalty, as administered in our state,” violates cruel
punishment clause of state constitution); see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 576 (2003)
(citing five state supreme court decisions holding prohibitions on same-sex intimacy unconstitutional
under state constitutions after Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) refused to do so under
Constitution); William W. Berry III, Cruel State Punishments, 98 N.C. L. REV. 1201 (2020)
(discussing legal theories for death penalty abolition available under state constitutional analogues to
Eighth Amendment); LaKeith Faulkner & Christopher R. Green, State-Constitutional Departures
From the Supreme Court: The Fourth Amendment, 89 MISS. L.J. 197 (2020) (collecting state law
cases providing greater protections than Fourth Amendment); David Rassoul Rangaviz, Compelled
Decryption and State Constitutional Protection Against Self-Incrimination, 57 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 157
(2020) (canvassing state constitutions that might be interpreted to provide greater protection against
compelled decryption than available under Fifth Amendment); Laura Denvir Stith, A Contrast of
State and Federal Court Authority to Grant Habeas Relief, 38 VAL. U. L .REV. 421, 431–37 (2004)
(collecting decisions holding under state law that freestanding actual innocence claims are cognizable
in post-conviction proceedings although Court has not definitively determined whether such claims
state a federal constitutional violation); see generally William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and
the States: The Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV.
535 (1986); William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977); Bruce Ledewitz, How State Courts Can Help America Recover the Rule
of Law: The Pennsylvania Experience, 82 ALB. L. REV. 1325 (2019).
For a proposal to utilize California law to extend the Bridgeforth holding to that state, see
Emily Rose Margolis, Note, Color as a Batson Class in California, 106 CAL. L. REV. 2067 (2018).
For a more general consideration of the context and implications of the case, see Vinay Harpalani,
Civil Rights Law in Living Color, 79 MD. L .REV. 881 (2019).
During 2019, the Supreme Courts of Kansas and Pennsylvania were asked to decide whether
the death penalty violates their state constitutions. See John Hanna, Kansas Abortion Ruling Prompts
New Attack on Death Penalty, AP NEWS (June 26, 2019), https://apnews.com/article/dd55
026d282043cabc84afa7e41ef644; An-Li Herring, PA Supreme Court to Consider Putting End to
Death Penalty, WESA-FM (Dec. 4, 2018), https://www.wesa.fm/post/pa-supreme-court-considerputting-end-death-penalty. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that it would not determine the
issue in the context of a statewide petition for extraordinary relief but would rule on claims properly
presented by individuals’ post-conviction petitions. See Cox v. Commonwealth, 218 A.3d 384 (Pa.
2019). In the Kansas Supreme Court case, Carr v. State, No. 90108 (docket available at
https://pittsreporting.kscourts.org/Appellate/CaseDetails?caseNumber=90198), briefing on the issue
was completed in November of 2019 but no decision had been issued as of this writing.
Of course the expansion of state constitutional rights beyond contemporaneously-recognized
federal ones may occur in civil cases as well as criminal ones, see, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.

636

OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW

Vol: 18.2:633

Properly understood, this arcane-sounding decision opens an important path
towards reform of the entire structure of criminal adjudication. Following that path
requires appreciating the critical importance of Montgomery’s roots in the
Supremacy Clause. As the remainder of this article argues, those roots mean that
many more new rules of federal law are “substantive” for purposes of state postconviction review than for purposes of federal habeas corpus. In the context of
state post-conviction proceedings, I propose, “substantive” rules of federal law
should be defined as all those whose policy underpinnings extend beyond
enhancing the factual accuracy of particular decisions. Examples include rules
whose aims embrace the repudiation of government misconduct (e.g., barring
evidence derived from coerced confessions or unreasonable searches) and the
achievement of full community participation in the judicial process (e.g., adding
new groups to the ones that may not constitutionally be excluded from jury service
and expanding the categories of juror bias that a defendant must be permitted to
litigate).
The consequence of adopting this broader definition of “substantive” will be
to increase the number of state post-conviction proceedings. That, in turn, will
improve the criminal justice system in two ways. First, state post-conviction
decisions will to some extent compensate for the Supreme Court’s restrictions on
the authority of the lower federal courts to adjudicate habeas corpus claims.
Second, the greater the salience of post-conviction decisions, the greater the
pressure on the states to improve the quality of their post-conviction systems.
Thus, establishing the appropriate definition of “substantive” under Montgomery is
not just a narrow doctrinal project. Adoption of the proposal of this article would
make a modest but real improvement to the quality of our criminal law.
B. Outline
After explaining the background of Montgomery in Part II, Part III argues that
the definition of “substantive” needs to be crafted to harmonize with the
Ct. 2584, 2611 (2015) (listing state supreme court decisions favoring same-sex marriage); ILYA
SOMIN, THE GRASPING HAND: KELO V. CITY OF NEW LONDON AND THE LIMITS OF EMINENT DOMAIN
181–87 (2015) (discussing state courts’ acceptance of limitation on Takings rejected under
Constitution in Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005)); Sanford Levinson, Courts as
Participants in “Dialogue”: A View from American States, 59 U. KAN. L. REV. 791, 810–29 (2011)
(discussing state-level successes of litigants seeking to equalize school funding in wake of
Constitutional defeat in San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973)); Jeffrey S.
Sutton, San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez and Its Aftermath, 94 VA. L. REV.
1963, 1971–77 (2008) (same); Samuel Wang et al., Laboratories of Democracy Reform: State
Constitutions and Partisan Gerrymandering, 22 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 203 (2019) (proposing that
partisan gerrymandering be attacked through litigation based on state constitutions); Derek Warden,
Disability Rights and the Louisiana Constitution, https://ssrn.com/abstract=3730757 (arguing that the
Louisiana Constitution forbids certain forms of disability discrimination) but those cases are also
outside the scope of this article.
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surrounding legal context, keeping firmly in mind the problem at hand.5 The Court
in Montgomery simply imported the definition that originated in Teague v. Lane.6
(Part III.A) But the still-evolving meaning of “substantive” for purposes of
Teague, which arose in the context of federal habeas corpus review, should
respond to the policy concerns arising when state prisoners mount federal
collateral attacks on their convictions. (Part III.B) For purposes of Montgomery,
the term should be defined so as to further the states’ long-established obligations
under the Supremacy Clause to give full effect to federal rights.7 (Part III.C)
Part IV points out that the Supreme Court of the United States is not the only
court with the power to recognize new federal rights to which Montgomery applies.
The practical importance of this is that states will be required to give retroactive
effect on state post-conviction to such rights in their own systems even before the
rights are recognized by the Supreme Court.
As the canonical Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee8 affirmed, our system has
recognized since the time of ratification that state courts are not just empowered
but obligated to shape the contours of federal law.9 Their freedom in this regard is

See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965) (“The line between ‘substance’ and
‘procedure’ shifts as the legal context changes.”); Guar. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109–
111 (1945) (stating that distinction between substance must be “applied with an eye alert to
essentials” of the particular problem at hand, regardless of terms’ use in other contexts, because a
“policy so important . . . must be kept free from entanglements with analytical or terminological
niceties.”).
5

6

Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 307 (1989).

7
See Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 734–42 (2009); Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131,
138–43 (1988). See also Carlos M. Vázquez & Stephen I. Vladeck, The Constitutional Right to
Collateral Post-Conviction Review, 103 VA. L. REV. 905, 911–12 (2017). These federal rights may
originate in federal statutes and treaties as well as the Constitution and my argument applies to those
situations as well. See infra notes 76, 138.
8

Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 323–34 (1816).

9
See id. at 340–42; Charlton C. Copeland, Federal Law in State Court: Judicial Federalism
Through a Relational Lens, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 511, 576–78 (2011); Judith S. Kaye, State
Courts in Our Federal System: The Contribution of the New York Court of Appeals, 46 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 217, 228 (1995) (“[A]s established by Justice Marshall more than two centuries ago . . . our
federal system has relegated the task of interpreting the federal constitution not only to the federal
courts but also to the courts of fifty states.”); Goodwin Liu, State Constitutions and the Protection of
Individual Rights: A Reappraisal, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1307, 1329 (2017) (observing that under
Supremacy Clause, “State courts are . . . obligated and entrusted to interpret [federal] constitutional
principles”). For a comprehensive overview of the past, present, and potential future of this power,
see Jason Mazzone, When the Supreme Court is Not Supreme, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 979, 980 (2010)
(observing that “[s]tate courts have always exercised a good deal of authority to determine,
independently and definitively, the meaning of the Constitution”).
This article is limited to the enunciation of federal rights in criminal cases, although a great
deal of the relevant jurisprudence flowed originally from civil controversies, see id. at 984–93, and
has continued to do so, see infra note 81; see generally Diego A. Zambrano, Federal Aggrandizement
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subject to judicial check only by the Supreme Court of the United States.10 Within
the geographical limits to which they apply, their decisions are for Supremacy
Clause purposes just as much statements of federal law as decisions of the United
States Supreme Court. Federalism is multipolar, not vertical. (Part IV.A)
Part IV then offers some past, present, and predictable future examples in
modern criminal law of state courts recognizing broader federal constitutional
protections for defendants than contemporary Supreme Court doctrine. (Part IV.B)
Part V elaborates the definition of “substantive” that should be used in the
Montgomery context and applies it to a number of illustrative situations.
Under Montgomery, the term includes its meaning under Teague but is not
limited to that meaning (Part V.A). “Substantive” federal rules for Montgomery
purposes are those implementing national policies whose principal goals are not
confined to enhancing the factual accuracy of particular decisions. The many
examples of such rules include ones whose purposes include discountenancing
government misconduct and achieving full community participation in the judicial
process. (Part V.B)
Part VI describes how the increased volume of state post-conviction
proceedings that Montgomery will engender might bring about beneficial
architectural changes to the current system of criminal adjudication.
Regardless of how broadly Montgomery is read—but particularly if courts
adopt an appropriate understanding of “substantive”—the case should lead to the
partial restoration of the lower courts’ role in shaping federal constitutional law in
the criminal area. As numerous judicial and academic commentators have pointed
out, that role was effectively destroyed with respect to the federal courts by the
combination of Teague and the statutory restrictions imposed by the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).11 If state courts begin to be
and the Decay of State Courts, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 2101 (2019) (overviewing current allocation of
civil cases between state and federal courts).
10 See Martin, 14 U.S. at 351–52. See also Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff,
Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 88 YALE L.J. 1035, 1049 (1977). For a
description of the background that focuses specifically on modern problems of relevance to this
article, see James S. Liebman & William F. Ryan, “Some Effectual Power”: The Quantity and
Quality of Decisionmaking Required of Article III Courts, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 696, 701–04 (1998).
11 See, e.g., 2 RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 5.1, text accompanying note 27 (7th ed. 2016); CAROL S. STEIKER & JORDAN M.
STEIKER, COURTING DEATH: THE SUPREME COURT AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 295 (2016) (describing
AEDPA as “decimating [the federal judiciary’s] ability to hear and redress claims of federal
constitutional violations” in criminal cases, rendering the remedy worthless); Richard H. Fallon, Jr. &
Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 Harv. L. Rev.
1731, 1820 (1991) (criticizing Teague “for sharply restricting habeas courts from either developing or
enforcing the constitutional law of criminal procedure”); Stephen R. Reinhardt, The Demise of
Habeas Corpus and the Rise of Qualified Immunity: The Court’s Ever Increasing Limitations on the
Development and Enforcement of Constitutional Rights and Some Particularly Unfortunate
Consequences, 113 MICH. L. REV. 1219, 1223–44 (2015). Cf. JEFFREY S. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT
SOLUTIONS: STATES AND THE MAKING OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 199–200 (2018) (noting
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heard from more often, the quantity of inter-court dialogue will increase, which
should improve the overall quality of legal thinking. (Part VI.A)
Moreover, there are already pressures bearing on the states from a variety of
angles to improve their post-conviction processes.12 The more Montgomery
increases the number of such proceedings, the stronger those pressures will
become, which should enhance the quality of all state post-conviction
adjudications. (Part VI.B)
Part VII is a brief conclusion that encourages all stakeholders in the criminal
justice system to take advantage of the reform opportunities that Montgomery
provides.
II. MONTGOMERY IN THE SUPREME COURT
In 2012 the Court ruled in Miller v. Alabama13 that the Eighth Amendment
forbade sentencing a juvenile to life without parole for homicide under a system
unfairness of this situation to state criminal defendants and encouraging state courts to develop
federal law even at the price of occasional reversals).
AEDPA was in many respects simply a codification of a number of rules limiting federal
habeas corpus review that the Court had already adopted in cases decided during the two decades
before the statute was enacted. See State v. Preciose, 609 A. 2d 1280, 1294 (N.J. 1992) (“[T]he
Supreme Court's retrenchment of federal habeas review . . . forces state prisoners to rely increasingly
on state post-conviction proceedings as their last resort for vindicating their state and federal
constitutional rights.”); Christopher Flood, Closing the Circle: Case v. Nebraska and the Future of
Habeas Reform, 27 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 633, 639 (2002) (“Since the early 1970s,
Congress and the federal courts have instituted a number of dramatic changes to the structure of
postconviction review. As a result of these changes, state postconviction proceedings have
increasingly become both the first and the last opportunity for state petitioners to claim the protection
of the courts from violations of their rights.”) (footnotes omitted); Mark Tushnet & Larry Yackle,
Symbolic Statutes and Real Laws: The Pathologies of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act and the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 47 DUKE L.J. 1, 1–4 (1997) (explaining that AEDPA would
need to be interpreted in light of the fact that “the judicial train [had arrived] at the station before the
legislative one”).
In one of its earliest such cases, the Court had cut off federal habeas corpus challenges to
states’ erroneous rejections of Fourth Amendment claims. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 481–82
(1976); Steven Semeraro, Enforcing Fourth Amendment Rights Through Federal Habeas Corpus, 58
RUTGERS L. REV. 983, 985–86 (2006) (proposing that Stone be overruled in light of AEDPA);
Theodore J. Kristek, Jr., Note, Redefining the Relationship Between Stone and AEDPA, 106 VA. L.
REV. 523 (2020) (arguing that AEDPA should be read to have superseded Stone); see generally, Mark
R. Brown, Bruce’s “Other” Supreme Court Case, 48 STETSON L. REV 307 (2019) (discussing
precursor to Stone). The particular relevance of Stone for present purposes is that it was in effect
during the period of the conflicting state court Fourth Amendment rulings discussed infra text
accompanying notes 115–17. Thus, a federal habeas court which concluded (accurately, as it turned
out) that the pro-defendant states were construing the Constitution correctly was disabled from giving
effect to its views.
12

See infra Part VI.B.

13

Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471 (2012).
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making the sentence mandatory.14 For the sentence to be constitutional, the
sentencer had to make a particularized determination that the defendant was one of
those rare juveniles whose crime reflected “irreparable corruption” rather than
“transient immaturity.”15
In the wake of this ruling, Henry Montgomery, a Louisiana prisoner who had
been sentenced as a juvenile to life without parole for murder under a mandatory
system in which no such determination was made, brought state post-conviction
proceedings seeking the benefit of Miller.16 He was unsuccessful; the Louisiana
courts held that under state law Miller was not retroactive to cases on collateral
review.17 Because states are free, within the limits of federal law, to craft their own
retroactivity doctrines applicable to post-conviction review,18 one would have
expected the Louisiana Attorney General in opposing Montgomery’s certiorari
petition to take the position that the ruling below rested on an independent and
adequate state ground that foreclosed Supreme Court review.19 That official might
have urged that although the state’s framework for retroactivity analysis was based
on the one the Court had adopted for federal habeas corpus cases in Teague,20 it
was still state law.21 The Attorney General did not make this argument, however,22
14 The Court had decided two years earlier that the states could not sentence a juvenile
offender to life without parole for a non-homicide offense without providing “some meaningful
opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.” See Graham v.
Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75 (2010). The states were forbidden from making a permanent judgment at the
time of sentencing that all such defendants are “irredeemable, and thus deserving of incarceration for
the duration of their lives.” Id. In addition, as discussed in more detail infra Part IV.B.1, the Court
had previously decided in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 276, 578 (2005), that capital punishment
could not be inflicted on defendants younger than eighteen.
15

Miller, 567 U.S. at 478–79 (internal citations omitted). The precise reach of the decision is
a matter of dispute. See infra text accompanying notes 107–09.
16

See Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 726 (2016). Montgomery remains
imprisoned. See Grace Toohey, After 55 Years in Prison, Baton Rouge Man Key to Supreme Court
Ruling Again Denied Freedom, THE ADVOCATE, (Apr. 11, 2019), https://www.theadv ocate.com/bat
on_rouge/news/courts/article_00ea4dd4-5c10-11e9-81e9-8b553bae84c3.html (reporting April 2019
parole denial; next hearing likely in two years).
17

See Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 727.

18

See Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264 (2008). Unlike Louisiana, some states had
decided under their own law to apply Miller retroactively, see, e.g., Falcon v. State, 162 So. 3d 954
(Fla. 2015); People v. Davis, 6 N.E.3d 709, 722 (Ill. 2014); State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 114–
17 (Iowa 2013).
19 See STEPHEN M. SHAPIRO ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE ch. 3.22 (11th ed. 2019)
(overviewing Court’s “Lack of Jurisdiction to Review Judgments Based on Independent and
Adequate State Grounds”).
20

Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).

21 Cf. Colwell v. State, 59 P.3d 463, 471 (Nev. 2002) (“We adopt the general framework of
Teague, but reserve our prerogative to define and determine within this framework whether a rule is
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and the Court therefore appointed an amicus to do so.23
The Court’s Montgomery opinion, written by Justice Kennedy for a sixmember majority, decided that, although Teague v. Lane had indeed been based on
retroactivity considerations specific to federal statutory habeas actions challenging
state criminal convictions,24 its ruling that new “substantive” rules of constitutional
law applied retroactively on collateral review was also a requirement of the
Supremacy Clause.25
The Court explained that convictions contrary to substantive rules are
constitutionally void regardless of when the rule was announced and that under the
Supremacy Clause states may not “mandate that a prisoner continue to suffer
punishment barred by the Constitution.”26 Hence, Louisiana could not apply its
own retroactivity rules to keep Mr. Montgomery out of court: “Where state
collateral review proceedings permit prisoners to challenge the lawfulness of their
confinement, States cannot refuse to give retroactive effect to a substantive
constitutional right that determines the outcome of that challenge.”27
The Court accordingly turned to the question of “whether Miller’s prohibition
on mandatory life without parole for juvenile offenders indeed did announce a new
substantive rule.”28 Applying Teague’s paradigm, the Court wrote that a procedural
rule was one regulating “only the manner of determining the defendant’s
culpability.”29 In contrast, a substantive rule (1) “forbids criminal punishment of

new and whether it falls within the two exceptions to nonretroactivity (as long as we give new federal
constitutional rules at least as much retroactive effect as Teague does).”).
See Brief in Opposition at 6, Montgomery (No. 14-280) (Dec. 3, 2014) (“Because Louisiana
has adopted Teague the Louisiana Supreme Court's determination as to whether Miller is retroactive
pursuant to Teague renders its decision ‘interwoven with the federal law.’ Michigan v. Long, 463
U.S. 1032, 1040 (1983). Here, the Louisiana Supreme Court ‘decided the case the way it did because
it believed that federal law [would require] it to do so.’ Id. at 1041.”).
22

23

See Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 727–28.

24

See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2017).

25 See Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 729. Stated slightly more technically, what Montgomery
held was that although the basic Teague rule of non-retroactivity for “new” rules was a prudential
one, its exceptions were constitutionally required. The Teague rule and its exceptions are described
infra Part III.B.
26

Montgomery, 136 S, Ct. at 731.

27

Id. at 731–32.

28

Id. at 732.

29

Id. (internal citations omitted). For example, permitting an advisory sentencing jury in a
Florida capital case to consider an invalid aggravating circumstance is unconstitutional, see Espinosa
v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1079 (1992), but the rule is procedural rather than substantive and therefore a
defendant whose direct appeal ended prior to Espinosa cannot successfully assert a claim based on it
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certain primary conduct” or (2) prohibits “a certain category of punishment for a
class of defendants because of their status or offense.”30
The Court explained that Miller had declared “life without parole an
unconstitutional penalty for ‘a class of defendants because of their status’—that is,
juvenile offenders whose crimes reflect the transient immaturity of youth . . . . As a
result, Miller announced a substantive rule of constitutional law.”31 Therefore,
“prisoners like Montgomery must be given the opportunity to show their crime did
not reflect irreparable corruption.”32
The principal dissent, written by Justice Scalia and joined by Justices Thomas
and Alito, attacked both the majority’s Supremacy Clause holding and its
categorization of the Miller rule as substantive.
The rule of Teague, Justice Scalia said, was a prudential response to the
problems of finality arising in the context of federal habeas corpus, and its
transformation into a Supremacy Clause mandate was unwarranted.33 “The
Supremacy Clause does not impose upon state courts a constitutional obligation it
to invalidate his conviction through a federal habeas corpus action. See Lambrix v. Singletary, 520
U.S. 518, 539 (1997). For other examples, see Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 735–36.
30 Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 732. A few months after Montgomery, Justice Kennedy, writing
for the Court over only a single dissent, added to his earlier definition the thought that “this Court has
determined whether a new rule is substantive or procedural by considering the function of the rule,”
Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1265 (2016). See infra Part III.B(1) (suggesting that the
meaning of “substantive” under Teague remains cloudy).
There is an extended discussion of what rules are “substantive” for Teague purposes in HERTZ
& LIEBMAN, supra note 11, §25.7. Examples in the first numbered category in the text include
constitutional rules protecting from punishment certain sorts of speech, see, e.g., Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), or intimate conduct, see, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Examples in the second category include imposing
capital punishment on defendants who are mentally retarded, see Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304
(2002); see also infra note 50 (noting subsequent change of nomenclature to “intellectually
disabled”), or for the offense of rape, see Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008); Coker v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
31 Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 724 (internal citations omitted). The Court noted that this
conclusion was unaffected by the fact that a state could meet the demands of Miller by adopting a
procedure to determine that the juvenile was one of the few on whom a sentence of life without
parole could appropriately be imposed. Id. at 734–35. Such a hearing would “not replace but rather
give[] effect to Miller’s substantive holding that life without parole is an excessive sentence for
children whose crimes reflect transient immaturity”. Id. at 735. For example, the Court said, the
constitutional prohibition on executing intellectually disabled defendants is undoubtedly substantive
notwithstanding that its implementation requires procedures to determine whether any particular
defendant falls within that class. “Those procedural requirements do not . . . transform substantive
rules into procedural ones.” Id.
32

Id. at 736.

33 Id. at 738–39. See also id. at 742–43 (describing majority as having “created jurisdiction
by . . . converting an equitable rule governing federal habeas relief to a constitutional command
governing state courts”).
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fails to impose on federal courts.”34
In any event, Justice Scalia continued, the rule of Miller was procedural rather
than substantive. That opinion had stated, “Our decision does not categorically bar
a penalty for a class of offenders or type of crime—as, for example, we did in
Roper or Graham. Instead, it mandates only that a sentencer follow a certain
process—considering an offender’s youth and attendant characteristics—before
imposing a particular penalty.”35 Thus, “it is as plain as day that the majority is not
applying Miller, but rewriting it.”36
The reason for this “distortion of Miller,” Justice Scalia suggested, was to
enable the Court to proscribe the sentencing of juveniles to life imprisonment
without parole while not acknowledging that it was doing so—an
acknowledgement which “would have been something of an embarrassment”
because the Court in outlawing the death penalty for juveniles in Roper37 had said
that life without parole was a severe enough punishment.38
Justice Thomas also contributed a separate dissent, whose thrust was that
because the Constitution does not require either the state or federal courts to
entertain post-conviction attacks at all, the extent to which they do so is “a matter
about which the Constitution has nothing to say.”39
III. SUBSTANCE IN CONTEXT
A. Overview
Montgomery imported its division between “substantive” and “procedural”
rules from Teague. But Teague arose in a very different context than Montgomery.
The problem presented by Teague was how to craft judicial rules for federal
habeas corpus review of state criminal convictions to accommodate the disruptive
effects of federal courts’ recognition of new constitutional rights, an issue
misleadingly but universally denominated one of “retroactivity.”40 The problem
34

Id. at 741. But see infra Part III.C (suggesting numerous flaws underpinning this assertion).

35

Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 483 (2012).

36 Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 743. As indicated infra text accompanying notes 107–09, the
Court is likely to re-address the Miller rule in the next year or so. Nothing in my argument depends
on what it decides.
37

Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 276 (2005) (discussed infra Part IV.B).

38

Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 744. See infra note 137 (discussing this passage).

39 Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 750. See infra text accompanying notes 164–66 & note 164
(discussing this statement).
40 See Danforth, 552 U.S. 271 & 271 n.5 (2008) (declining to alter terminology but explaining
that “retroactivity” misleadingly suggests that issue is when right came into existence whereas in fact
the question in such cases is “redressability,” i.e., “whether a violation of the right that occurred prior
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presented by Montgomery was how to define the obligations of the state courts
under the Supremacy Clause when called upon to adjudicate such rights, regardless
of when they were first recognized. Those two questions are not the same.41
B. The Teague Context
There has been a great deal written on the origins, formulation, interpretation,
and consequences of the Teague rule and I do not intend to repeat those analyses
here.42
Tersely put, during the 1950s and 1960s the Court recognized a number of
new constitutional rights in the criminal law area. In critiquing these
developments, observers such as Justice Harlan noted that the settled expectations
of the states would be upended and the costs to the court system increased if all
state prisoners whose proceedings had not conformed to the newly-announced
rules could afterwards mount successful collateral attacks on their convictions by
federal habeas corpus.43
Eventually, the Court responded to these concerns by creating the doctrine
announced in Teague.44 A federal court considering a federal habeas corpus attack
to the announcement of the new rule will entitle a criminal defendant to the relief sought”).
Specifically, the Court described Teague as grounded in “equitable and prudential considerations,” id.
at 278. Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Kennedy, dissented, taking the position that the
majority was wrong in its “view that retroactivity is a remedial question,” id. at 304. Their position
was that in determining the question of retroactivity the Court was determining the content of the
federal law applicable to the case at hand, id. at 307, “something on which the Constitution gives this
Court the final say,” id. at 303. This view may well explain why Justice Kennedy could write, and
Chief Justice Roberts join, the Montgomery majority in rejecting Justice Scalia’s complaint, quoted
supra note 33, that the Court had “convert[ed] an equitable rule governing federal habeas relief to a
constitutional command governing state courts;” they did not accept his characterization of Teague’s
prohibition on the application of “new” rules by federal habeas courts as grounded in equitable
considerations. These issues are further discussed infra note 44.
41

See Liebman & Ryan, supra note 10, at 859–64 (using Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde,
514 U.S. 749 (1995) to illustrate the point). The multiple legal, conceptual, and practical problems
generated by applying the Teague definition of “substantive” to the Montgomery context are ably
overviewed in Lee Kovarsky, Structural Change in State Postconviction Review, 93 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 443, 487–96 (2017).
42

For a comprehensive discussion see HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 11, ch. 25. A recent
treatment that situates the case within the Court’s overall civil and criminal retroactivity
jurisprudence appears in Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, Loving Retroactivity, 45 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
383, 392–419 (2018).
43

Rhodes supra note 42, at 392–95; Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 7, at 916–17.

44 “Teague is plainly grounded in [the Court’s authority under 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (2017) to
adjust] the scope of federal habeas relief in accordance with equitable and prudential considerations,”
Danforth, 552 U.S. at 278.
The court adopted Teague’s limitations on the application of new law to serve “the interests of
the States, not the federal courts.” HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 11, § 25.6, text accompanying
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on a state criminal conviction must as a threshold matter decide whether a ruling
for the prisoner would require the statement of a new rule.45 If so, the habeas court
must dismiss the case unless the proposed new rule would be (1) substantive46 or a
(2) watershed rule of criminal procedure.47 An early example of the application of
the methodology took place in Penry v. Lynaugh,48 where a Texas Death Row
prisoner asserted that the Constitution precluded his execution because he was
mentally retarded. The Court held that it could reach the constitutional question,
even though the rule he sought was “new,” because it was substantive.49 On the
merits, the Court concluded that the new rule Penry sought did not exist,50 but that
he was entitled to prevail on his claim that the proceedings below had violated the
Court’s “old” rule requiring a sentencer to give consideration to his mental
retardation as a mitigating factor.51 In partial dissent, Justice Scalia, speaking for
note 25 (original emphasis). Hence, contrary to the ruling in Knight v. Fla. Dep’t. of Corr., 936 F. 3d
1322, 1331–34 (11th Cir. 2019), if a state, as it is fully entitled to do, id. at 1332 (citing Danforth),
adopts a rule allowing a prisoner to assert more claims than Teague would, the federal court should
“respect the State’s implicit conclusion that a conviction’s and sentence’s constitutionality is more
important to the State than the conviction’s and sentence’s finality.” HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra
text accompanying note 25. Indeed, that outcome “may be required,” id., lest a prudential rule be
turned into a limitation on federal subject matter jurisdiction. Of the current Justices, only Chief
Justice Roberts, in his Danforth dissent discussed supra note 40, has rejected the view of the
Danforth majority quoted in the first paragraph of this note that Teague’s limitation on the
application of new rules in federal habeas corpus is indeed a prudential one.
45 The requirement that this issue be considered first, which is criticized at length in Id., §25.4
(discussing “Nonretroactivity as a ‘threshold’ question”), “is far from a merely technical matter”
because its practical effect is to forbid lower federal judges “to interpret the United States
Constitution in habeas corpus cases and relegate[] those judges to the virtually ministerial task of
putting into operation decisions that the Supreme Court renders on direct review,” id. at 1408. Thus
the only criminal law contexts in which the lower federal courts may regularly engage in the common
law development of new constitutional rules are the trial and direct appeal phases of federal criminal
prosecutions.
46

See Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 732 (setting forth definition of substantive for Teague
purposes); supra text accompanying note 30 (quoting definition); infra text accompanying notes 61–
62 (discussing definition).
47

See Teague, 488 U.S. at 311–15 (1989).

48

Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).

49

Id. at 329–30.

50

This aspect of Penry was explicitly overruled by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002)
(holding mentally retarded persons exempt from execution under Eighth Amendment). Some years
later the Court changed its terminology from “mentally retarded” to “intellectually disabled,” see
Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 704 (2014), but I have not done so retrospectively in this article.
51

Penry, 492 U.S. at 328. The Court explained, id. at 315–19, that Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S.
262 (1976) had upheld the Texas death penalty statute based upon the Court’s understanding that it
would be read so as to “permit the sentencer to consider all of the relevant mitigating evidence a
defendant might present in imposing sentence,” and that in cases decided well before the filing of
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four Justices, heatedly disputed that this latter rule was “old.”52
And so it goes. From the time it was announced, Teague has been both
controversial in concept and incomprehensible in application.53 Within months of
the decision, the New York City Bar Association called for it to be legislatively
overruled with respect to capital cases because of its “arbitrary and perverse
consequences . . . where life is at stake.”54 Leading scholars soon criticized the
effects of the ruling on criminal justice adjudication generally, pointing out that it
created an inappropriate incentive structure for the states, threatened norms of
fundamental fairness, and deprived the justice system of the beneficial work of the
lower federal courts.55 Today, like astronomers trying to elaborate the Ptolemaic
system of astronomy, judges viewing Teague quarrel over whether their dueling
perceptions result from sound “metaphysics” or instead “ignore[] reality . . . here
on Earth, [where] the laws of physics still apply” and the Supreme Court cannot
“alter the space time continuum.”56
As desirable as it may be to abolish or modify Teague, that is not the
argument of this section. The point here is far more modest. Even if no changes are
made to the Teague doctrine in cases where it applies, i.e., on federal habeas
corpus, to import it without reflection into contexts other than federal habeas
corpus would be extremely poor policy. The Montgomery situation, which does not
involve federal habeas corpus but rather the demands of the Supremacy Clause in
Penry’s habeas corpus petition the Court had applied the rule to invalidate portions of the Oklahoma
and Ohio death penalty statutes. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio,
438 U.S. 586 (1978).
52 Penry, 492 U.S. at 352. At the other end of the spectrum, the four Justices who had
dissented in Teague, a non-capital case, attacked its unconsidered extension to capital cases, see id. at
341 (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting), and two of those also specifically targeted the framework
under which retroactivity is a threshold consideration. See id. at 350 (Stevens & Blackmun, JJ.,
dissenting) (“[I]t is neither logical nor prudent to consider a rule’s retroactive application before the
rule itself is articulated.”).
53

See HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 11, § 25.1, text accompanying notes 10–25
(overviewing continuing differences among Justices and confusion in lower federal courts “over the
import and application of fundamental components of the doctrine,” and observing that other
jurisprudential developments suggest “that the Court may or ought to be prepared to reconsider the
premises underlying the Teague doctrine as a whole”).
54 See Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Committee on Civil Rights,
Legislative Modification of Federal Habeas Corpus in Capital Cases, 44 REC. ASSOC. BAR 848, 849,
852–53 (1989). By way of disclosure, I was the principal author of this report, see id. at 860.
55

See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 11, at 1816–20.

56 Compare Lester v. United States, 921 F.3d 1306, 1317 (11th Cir. 2019) (statement of
William Pryor, J. respecting denial of rehearing en banc) with id. at 1331 (statement of Rosenbaum, J.
joined by Martin and Jill Pryor, JJ. respecting denial of rehearing en banc). Their difficulties are
entirely understandable. See ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 314
n.36 (2000) (describing Teague as case that “recategorizes Time itself”).
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state post-conviction proceedings, is one of those contexts.
As we move on to consider that context in the next section, two points about
Teague, one intellectual and one practical, should be borne in mind.
1.

57

A great deal of thinking has been devoted to the still-murky
questions of whether a rule is “new,”57 and when during the course
of an individual prisoner’s litigation it became so.58 Much less has
been devoted to Teague’s exceptions.59 In particular, there is no
reason to think that we have fully mapped the cloudy astronomical
region of the so-called first Teague exception, viz. that even if a rule
of constitutional law is “new,” a federal habeas corpus court may
apply it if the rule is “substantive.”60 Indeed, the Court has hinted
that the term “substantive” covers more territory than has yet been
explored. “Although Teague describes new substantive rules as an
exception to the bar on retroactive application of procedural rules,
this Court has recognized that substantive rules ‘are more accurately
characterized as . . . not subject to the bar.’”61 This otherwise
unexplained statement may reflect a recognition that in the context
of federal review of detentions the concept currently sought to be
captured by labelling some claims “substantive” is not a new one
that sprang into being in the second half of the twentieth century.
There is a long history, dating back to the Judiciary Act of 1789, of
making federal review available to federal and state prisoners
See HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 11, §25.5.

58

Because Teague only applies to new rules, if a rule was announced before the prisoner’s
conviction became final the doctrine will not be a barrier on federal habeas corpus. See id., § 25.6,
text accompanying note 1 (explaining that “The point at which ‘finality’ sets in is . . . critical for
nonretroactivity purposes”); see also McKinney v. Arizona, No.18-1109 (2019), Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari at 19–20, cert. granted 2019 WL 936074 (June 10, 2019) (arguing in successful petition
for review that under Teague “finality is not always final”). This insight is the basis for the proposal
made in Ruthanne M. Deutsch, Federalizing Retroactivity Rules: The Unrealized Promise of
Danforth v. Minnesota and the Unmet Obligation of State Courts to Vindicate Federal Constitutional
Rights, 44 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 53, 77–81 (2016) that the state courts are in certain circumstances
required to hear in post-conviction proceedings constitutional claims that did not exist at the time of
direct appeal but would be barred from federal habeas corpus review as stating a “new” rule.
59 See Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 7, at 920 (noting relative lack of commentary
regarding provenance of Teague exceptions).
60 See supra text accompanying note 45. The next paragraph of text parses the “so called.” In
its current formulation, the second Teague exception, for “watershed” new rules of criminal
procedure, see supra text accompanying note 47, is very narrow, see HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note
11, §25.7, text accompanying notes 26–27, and I will not discuss it further.
61 Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 728 (2016) (quoting Schriro v. Summerlin, 542
U.S. 348, 352 n.4 (2004)).
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asserting claims that their imprisonments violated either the
Constitution or other fundamental rights of national importance.62
To the extent that Teague jurisprudence has become disconnected
from this history, that is a flaw in Teague’s doctrinal framework.
Students of Teague should be working to repair the flaw. More to
the present point, it should not be carried forward when legal
thinkers are called upon to build doctrinal frameworks in other
environments.
As previously noted,63 one deleterious practical effect of current
Teague doctrine has been that, in the criminal area only, the process
of formulating new constitutional rules has been substantially
deprived of the benefits of percolation through the lower federal
courts that commonly enriches and improves the quality of judicial
decision-making.64 Ameliorating that situation would benefit the
justice system.65

C. The Montgomery Context
The Supremacy Clause background relevant to this article is
uncontroversial.66 Under the Constitution, no lower federal courts need be
created.67 And even if they are, they might be granted only limited subject matter
62 See 1 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 11, § 2.4[d][x], text accompanying notes 287–89; id.,
§2.4 [e]; see also Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 271–72 (2008); ERIC M. FREEDMAN, HABEAS
CORPUS: RETHINKING THE GREAT WRIT OF LIBERTY 61–62 (2003). There is also a long history of
criticism of judicial attempts to articulate the boundaries of this territory. See, e.g., Note, The Writ of
Habeas Corpus in the Federal Courts, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 404, 406, 412 (1935) (describing
contemporary doctrine respecting availability of writ to prisoners as displaying “the confusion and
inconsistency necessarily incident to the attempt to conceptualize the inconceptual” and arguing that
its “hopeless entanglement” be replaced with a rational jurisprudence focused on “the relative values,
as applied to the specific defect, of finality of judicial determination and flexibility in reexamination
of errors in the interests of human liberty.”).
63

See supra note 45.

64 The effect of Teague in combination with that of AEDPA, see supra text accompanying
note 11, has been that “state postconviction is the best opportunity for . . . lower courts, and
ultimately the Supreme Court . . . to decide open questions in federal constitutional criminal
procedure.” Giovanna Shay, The New State Postconviction, 46 AKRON L. REV. 473, 475 (2013).
65

See infra Part VI.A.

66

The propositions in the next three sentences of text are all to be found in Palmore v. United
States, 411 U.S. 389, 400–02 (1973).
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (creating Supreme Court and authorizing creation of “such
inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish”); RICHARD H. FALLON ET
AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM, Ch. 1, § C.2 (7th ed.
2015) (describing background of the “Madisonian Compromise” leading to this provision). An
67
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jurisdiction.68 Hence, if national law is to be truly national, state courts need to
implement it. As the Court has held since the Marshall era,69 that is why the text of
the Clause states explicitly: “This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State
shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding.”70
The state courts must accordingly be open to federal claims absent a “valid
excuse.”71 Of course, it is not a valid excuse that a state disagrees with the policy
extensively documented discussion of the proceedings at the Constitutional Convention respecting
both Article III and the Supremacy Clause that eventuated in the “Madisonian Compromise” appears
in Liebman & Ryan, supra note 10, at 705–73.
68 In fact, as described in FALLON ET AL., supra note 67, ch. VIII, § 1, except for a very brief
period between the enactment of the Act of Feb. 13, 1801, 2 Stat. 89 and its repeal by the Act of
March 8, 1802, 2 Stat. 13, the federal courts did not have general federal question jurisdiction until
1875. See GERALD LEONARD & SAUL CORNELL, THE PARTISAN REPUBLIC: DEMOCRACY, EXCLUSION
AND THE FALL OF THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, 1780S—1830S at 87–92, 103–04 (2019); Tyler S.
Moore, Trimming the Least Dangerous Branch: The Anti-Federalists and the Implementation of
Article III, 56 TULSA L. REV. 1 (2020). That year saw enactment of the Act of March 3, 1875, § 1, 18
Stat. 470 (imposing amount in controversy requirement of $500), the lineal predecessor of 28 U.S.C §
1331 (2017). Not long afterwards, the Court stated forcefully that the passage of the statute did not in
any way alter the Supremacy Clause obligations of state courts adjudicating habeas cases to enforce
federal rights. See Robb v. Connolly, 111 U.S. 624, 635–39 (1884).
69

See Liebman & Ryan, supra note 10, at 799–804 (discussing Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14
U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816) and Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821)).
70

U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. See Saikrishna Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Origins of Judicial
Review, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 887, 903 (2003).
Justice Scalia’s statement, “The Supremacy Clause does not impose upon state courts a
constitutional obligation it fails to impose on federal courts,” is one that he himself describes as “a
maxim,” Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 741 (2016) (Scalia, J., dissenting), and is
unsupported by any authority. More significantly, it is at odds with both the original intent of the
provision and its drafting history. These have been recently been canvassed in a detailed scholarly
study which describes the obligations that the Supremacy Clause does impose on the federal courts.
See William Michael Treanor, The Case of the Dishonest Scrivener: Gouverneur Morris and the
Creation of the Federalist Constitution, https://ssrn.com/abstract=3383183, at 81–82 (draft dated
June 15, 2020 of article to be published in Michigan Law Review). For a discussion of other legal
provisions bearing on the obligation of the federal courts to hear habeas claims, see infra notes 184–
91 and accompanying text. The federal government is of course bound by the prohibition against the
imposition or enforcement of substantively invalid convictions or sentences, see Leah M. Litman,
Legal Innocence and Federal Habeas, 104 VA. L. REV. 417, 486–87 & 487 n.328 (2018), but that
long-recognized rule is more comfortably rooted in principles of substantive due process than
supremacy.
71

See Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 735 (2009); Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 392
(1947). Subsequent to my writing of this article, an argument has been made by Ann Woolhandler
and Michael G. Collins, State Jurisdictional Independence and Federal Supremacy, 72 FLA. L. REV.
73 (2020) that the cases in this line were historically wrong and should not be followed in
implementing Montgomery. The many flaws in this argument are ably sketched out in Carlos M.
Vázquez & Stephen I. Vladeck, Testa, Crain, and the Constitutional Right to Collateral Relief, 72
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of the federal law.72 Hence, states have often defended refusing to hear a federal
claim by asserting that their reason for doing so was not policy-based but rather
“procedural.”73 The Supreme Court has never accepted that argument.74 The
definition of a “valid excuse” does not depend on whether the state rule is
“substantive” or “procedural,” but rather on whether its enforcement will
frequently and predictably interfere with vindication of the federal right.75 Thus,
for instance, a state rule requiring the prompt filing of a detailed notice of claim as
a predicate to damages actions against government officers cannot be applied to
actions based on a federal statute because the rule would systematically deprive
plaintiffs of the full benefit of such actions, as well as leading to inconsistent
results depending on the state in which the federal action was brought.76
Hypothetically, then, if post-conviction actions in Louisiana must be filed on
8.5 x 11 inch paper but Henry Montgomery had filed his Miller claim on 11 x 14
inch paper, there would probably have been no Supremacy Clause violation in
rejecting the claim. The Louisiana rule would be a “valid excuse,” not because the
paper size rule is “procedural” rather than “substantive” but because its application
would not frequently and predictably defeat enforcement of the federal right.77 A
FLA. L. REV. F. 10 (2021), Part I. See also infra note 78 (citing additional Supremacy Clause support
for conclusions of this article).
72 Haywood, 556 U.S. at 736. It makes no difference that the state’s view on the matter is so
strong that it also keeps from its courts corresponding state-law claims. See id. at 739–42 (dispelling
“misperception” that state excuse is valid so long as state and federal claims are treated equally;
“equality of treatment is . . . the beginning, not the end, of the Supremacy Clause analysis”).
73

See, e.g., Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239, 248 (1942).

74 See, e.g., id. at 245–46 (rejecting defense and holding that question for determination was
whether the state court proceeded in such a way that “rights of the parties under controlling federal
law would be protected”). See also Allen Erbsen, A Unified Approach to Erie Analysis for Federal
Statutes, Rules, and Common Law, 10 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. at 25–28, 93 (forthcoming 2020)
(available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3607678) (noting that distinction between substance and
procedure plays no role in Supremacy Clause analysis).
75

See Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 141 (1988).

76
See id. at 140–53. The text of the Supremacy Clause applies not just to federal rights
arising under the Constitution but also to ones flowing from treaties and federal statutes, and many
important Court precedents, including Haywood, Testa, Garrett and Felder, have glossed the Clause
in the latter situation, e.g., Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 507–08 (1962); Clafin
v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 136–37 (1876). The source of the federal right does not make any
difference to the Supremacy Clause analysis. See generally Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Treaties as the
Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause and the Judicial Enforcement of Treaties, 122 HARV. L.
REV. 599, 601–02 (2008). Thus, although most Montgomery cases are likely to arise in situations
where the newly recognized right arises under the Constitution, nothing in my analysis infra Part V.B
depends on that circumstance. See infra note 138.
77 The “probably” in the last sentence covers some unusual hypothetical fact pattern under
which this statement would be untrue, as, for example, if there existed a prison rule forbidding

2021

THE SUBSTANCE OF MONTGOMERY RETROACTIVITY

651

blanket rule of state law denying retroactivity to Miller claims, on the other hand,
would have that effect and be invalid under the Supremacy Clause.78 The same
would be true of state default or exhaustion rules requiring the assertion of claims
not yet in existence.
In the actual Montgomery case, the Supreme Court was not using
“substantive” to define the nature of the state’s barrier to relief, but rather to define
the class of new rules of constitutional law that the state post-conviction court was
required to hear irrespective of its retroactivity doctrines. Nevertheless, because the
strong impetus of Supremacy Clause law since the founding has been to require
federal constitutional claims brought in state court to be heard while the strong
impetus of retroactivity law in the Teague era has been to prevent federal
constitutional claims brought in federal court from being heard, the appropriate
definition of “substantive” rules for Montgomery purposes requires an analysis that
focuses on the policies underlying the Supremacy Clause.
Such an analysis appears in Part V below. But to conduct it soundly we must
first remind ourselves that the Supreme Court of the United States is not the only
judicial body with the power to recognize new federal rights that a state court must
enforce. The reminder is needed for two reasons. First, as an intellectual matter, a
definition of “substantive” rules in the Montgomery context that is true to the
structural postulates of the Supremacy Clause needs to take into account that state
supreme courts have the same authority.79 Second, as a practical matter, once a
state supreme court recognizes a new federal “substantive” right, the state postconviction courts will be required to enforce it regardless of whether the Supreme
Court has yet recognized the right.
possession of 8.5 x 11-inch paper. Cf. Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 485 (1969) (invalidating state
prison rule forbidding prisoner from assisting others to prepare habeas petitions; “Since the basic
purpose of the writ is to enable those unlawfully incarcerated to obtain their freedom, it is
fundamental that access of prisoners to the courts for the purpose of presenting their complaints may
not be denied or obstructed.”)
78 See Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 7, at 935–39 (providing additional doctrinal support
for this conclusion); Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 71, Part II (providing strong further support for
this aspect of their argument in response to Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 71). See also Bowles
v. Florida, U.S. LEXIS 4565, at *1–2 (Aug. 22, 2019) (statement of Justice Sotomayor respecting
denial of certiorari) (noting that state procedural rule requiring claims of ineligibility for execution
based on the intellectual disability ruling in Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701 (2014) to be filed ten years
before the case was decided “creates grave tension with this Court’s guidance in Montgomery v.
Louisiana”).
79
Cf. Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 7, at 954 (“[W]e think that the right recognized in
Montgomery is a right to obtain collateral relief in state courts for claims based on new substantive
rules that have been definitively recognized for the first time by the Supreme Court after the
petitioner’s conviction became final. The holding [rests on an understanding] of the effect of Supreme
Court decisions recognizing new substantive rules.”) (original emphasis). I think this statement is
correct as a description of the situation that the Montgomery Court had particularly in mind, see infra
note 87. But, for the reasons described in the remainder of this article, I do not think that the case is
limited to those circumstances.
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IV. STATE RECOGNITION OF NEW FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
A. Overview
The autonomy of state courts to interpret federal constitutional guarantees
independently of Supreme Court jurisprudence was so intrinsic to the original
structure of the Constitution that the federal jurisdictional statutes in place until the
end of 1914 did not give a litigant asserting that a state supreme court had rendered
a decision over-protecting federal constitutional rights recourse to the Supreme
Court; only a party asserting the wrongful denial of a federal claim (meaning in
criminal cases the defendant) could seek Supreme Court review.80 The modern
statutory framework is different, though, and in parsing it the Supreme Court has
been assiduous in asserting its exclusive role as the last word on the scope of
federal constitutional rights.81
There are, nevertheless, many reasons why a state decision expanding
defendants’ federal constitutional rights82 may go unreviewed by the Supreme
Court and thus become binding in the rendering jurisdiction. For instance, the
government may not seek review;83 the decision may not be final for purposes of
80

See Mazzone, supra note 9, at 990.

81 See Peter N. Salib & David K. Suska, The Federal-State Standing Gap: How to Enforce
Federal Law in Federal Court Without Article III Standing, 26 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1155,
1203–09 (2018) (explaining jurisprudence, much which has developed in civil disputes and rests on
“shaky” legal foundations, as driven by Court’s wish to “reserve[] to itself the power to conclusively
interpret federal law,” id. at 1203).
82 The cases of interest for this Part are ones in which the state courts self-consciously break
new doctrinal ground, e.g., Eunjoo Seo v. State, 148 N.E.3d 952 (Ind., 2020) (holding that Fifth
Amendment forbids requiring defendant to reveal password of lawfully-seized electronic device);
Commonwealth v. Davis, 220 A. 3d 534 (Pa. 2019) (same), not ones in which they simply apply old
doctrines to fact patterns that have not yet come to the Court. See, e.g., Jardines v. State, 73 So. 3d 34
(Fla. 2011), aff’d Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013) (finding dog sniff search on homeowner’s
property unconstitutional); In re Ellison, 385 P.3d 15 (Kan. 2016) (holding, in accord with other state
courts, that federal constitutional right to speedy trial applies to civil commitment proceedings
against sex offender). Of course, how any particular case is to be categorized may well be a disputed
question whose resolution depends on the ultimate opinion of the Court.
83

For example, in 2018 the local authorities in the District of Columbia and New York State
determined not to appeal decisions of their highest courts that misdemeanor defendants not otherwise
entitled to jury trials under existing Supreme Court Sixth Amendment doctrine gained that right if
they could be deported as a result of their convictions. See Bado v. United States, 186 A.3d 1243
(D.C. 2018) (en banc); People v. Suazo, 118 N.E.3d 168 (N.Y. 2018); Dan M. Clark, DA Will Not
Seek SCOTUS Review of Immigrant’s Jury Trial Right, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 5, 2018, at 1. In an earlier
example, no review was sought by the government when, in Perez v. Sharp, 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948),
the Supreme Court of California held in a civil case that the state’s statute prohibiting interracial
marriage violated the Equal Protection Clause. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 6 n.5 (1967)
(citing case).
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the Court’s certiorari jurisdiction;84 the federal constitutional ruling may not be
dispositive of the outcome;85 or the Justices may decide for prudential reasons to
allow the envelope-pushing ruling to stand.86 Moreover, some Justices have
suggested that discretionary review should be granted particularly sparingly when
sought by state governments in criminal cases.87
A rule of federal constitutional law recognized idiosyncratically by a state
may of course form the basis of a state post-conviction claim in that state.
Moreover, because the rule is in that state as fully an authoritative construction of
the Constitution as is a decision of the United States Supreme Court,88 the courts of
that state are required under the Supremacy Clause89 to give their new rules the
retroactive effect mandated by Montgomery.90 This doctrinal conclusion is both
84 See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (a) (2017) (granting certiorari jurisdiction over “[f]inal judgments or
decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had”). For example, as
further discussed infra note 97, in Barber v. Gladden, 298 P.2d 986 (Ore. 1956), the Oregon Supreme
Court decided as a matter of first impression that the Equal Protection Clause required that an
indigent unsuccessful petitioner for state habeas corpus be permitted to appeal without posting an
appeals bond. That, however, was an interlocutory ruling and whether the Supreme Court could
(much less would) have reviewed it at the State’s behest is murky at best. See SHAPIRO et al., supra
note 19, ch. 3.7 (describing case law under § 1257 (a)). Eventually the prisoner lost his appeal on the
merits and the Supreme Court then denied his certiorari petition. See Barber v. Gladden, 309 P.2d
192 (Ore. 1957), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 948 (1959). Similarly, Eunjoo Seo is an unlikely candidate for
Supreme Court review because it is arguably moot under federal, although not state, standards. See
148 N.E.3dat 963 (Massa, J., dissenting).
85 See, e.g., State v. Hodge, 726 A.2d 531, 550–54 (Conn. 1999) (deciding in wake of Batson
v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (forbidding jury challenges on basis of race) that Equal Protection
Clause forbids jury challenges on basis of religion but determining that challenge under review had
not been made on that basis). For a comprehensive overview of Batson jurisprudence, see Elisabeth
Semel, Batson and the Discriminatory Use of Peremptory Challenges in the 21st Century, in 1 NJP
LITIGATION CONSULTING, JURYWORK: SYSTEMATIC TECHNIQUES 245 (2d ed. 2018–19). For a
discussion of the current status of jury challenges based on religion, see id., at 270–73.
86 See SHAPIRO ET AL., supra note 19, ch. 4.25 (describing common considerations influencing
whether to grant review of state court decisions).
87 See, e.g., Kansas v. Carr, 577 U.S. 108, 127–32 (2016) (Sotomayor, J. dissenting and
collecting authorities). Justice Scalia responded for the Court: “What a state court cannot do is
experiment with our Federal Constitution and expect to elude this Court’s review so long as victory
goes to the criminal defendant.” Id. at 641. As this example shows, the Justices are at some level
aware of the state courts’ authority to formulate new federal constitutional law doctrines, but that
awareness may be fairly described as sporadic. Their default mode, as in Montgomery, is to assume
that any new rule of federal constitutional law, at least any important and long-lasting one, will
emanate from themselves.
88

See supra text accompanying notes 8–10.

89 The text of the Supremacy Clause, which has been quoted, supra note 3, is specifically
directed to state court judges. See generally, supra Part III.C.
90 See infra Part V.B (describing Montgomery mandate). A further discussion of the subject
matter of this paragraph of text appears in Part II of my reply article, Eric M. Freedman, Montgomery
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sensible and unremarkable because for Supremacy Clause purposes the critical
point is the origin of the rule in the Constitution, not the identity of the court
pronouncing it.
Confining itself to the last half century or so, and with no pretense to
exhaustive coverage, the next section of this Part provides a few examples of
criminal cases in which state supreme courts have construed the federal
constitution in a way more protective of individual rights than the Supreme Court
of the United States had done at the time.
Of course, if a court follows this path without also determining that the same
result would follow under state law, then its ruling is vulnerable to reversal by the
Supreme Court of the United States, a highly significant risk that would not
otherwise exist.91 Furthermore, because Montgomery is bottomed on the
Supremacy Clause, a state supreme court basing its ruling on non-federal law is not
subject to the retroactivity obligations that the case imposes.
On the other hand, there may be a number of affirmative reasons for a state
supreme court to utilize its authority to expand the contours of federal
constitutional rights.92 Quite apart from the possibility that the legal arguments are
and “Substantive” Rights Enforceable Retroactively in State Post-Conviction Proceedings: A Brief
Reply to Professor Vázquez, 18.2 OHIO STATE J. OF CRIM. L. 263, 265–66 (2021).
91

See Kansas v. Carr, 577 U.S. 108, 118 (2016) (discussed supra note 87). The course of
freedom of expression jurisprudence in New York in the 1980s illustrates some of the competing
considerations. In Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697 (1986) the Court reversed a ruling in
favor of an adult bookstore that the New York Court of Appeals had rested on First Amendment
grounds. On remand, the Court of Appeals reinstated its holding on the basis of the state constitution.
See People ex. rel. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 503 N.E.2d 492 (N.Y. 1986). Civil liberties
nationally plainly would have been better served if the Court of Appeals had taken that route, at least
in the alternative, the first time rather than relying exclusively on the First Amendment.
The Court’s decision in New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982), which I have criticized at
some length elsewhere, see Eric M. Freedman, A Lot More Comes into Focus When You Remove the
Lens Cap: Why Proliferating New Technologies Make it Particularly Urgent for the Supreme Court
to Abandon its Inside-Out Approach to Freedom of Speech, and Bring Obscenity, Fighting Words,
and Group Libel Within the First Amendment, 81 IOWA L. REV. 883, 925–29 (1996), was also a
reversal of a New York Court of Appeals decision upholding a First Amendment challenge. In that
instance, the Court of Appeals on remand held that the defendant’s claim lacked merit under the state
constitution. See State v. Ferber, 441 N.E.2d 1100 (N.Y. 1982). In light of this view, the Court of
Appeals could not have avoided deciding the First Amendment issue in its original opinion. This
differentiates the case from Arcara, where the Court of Appeals thought that the challenge had merit
under both bodies of law and therefore had freedom to choose between them without changing the
outcome.
92 For an overview of a number of these by a retired Chief Justice of the Connecticut Supreme
Court, see Chase T. Rogers, Putting Meat on Constitutional Bones: The Authority of State Courts to
Craft Constitutional Prophylactic Rules Under the Federal Constitution, 98 B.U.L. REV. 541, 572–73
(2018) (including possibility that effect of awaiting Supreme Court pronouncement which may never
come would be that “important rights may be underenforced, and large areas of constitutional law
may never be developed, to the loss of both state courts and, ultimately, the Supreme Court”)
(footnotes omitted).
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in fact stronger under federal than state constitutional law,93 there may be
constraints on the ability of the state supreme court to rest its decision on state
constitutional law that do not apply to its interpretation of the Constitution.94 For
example, various provisions of the state constitutions of California, Florida and
Louisiana provide that they shall not be interpreted more expansively than their
federal counterparts.95
Moreover, state supreme courts, which are subject to electoral
accountability,96 may sometimes find it attractive to rely on the federal
constitution. Following that course might permit them to shift the blame for
potentially unpopular results to the federal government97 and to take advantage of
93

See Mazzone, supra note 9, at 1062–1063; Rogers, supra note 92, at 573 & 573 n.164. See
generally Allan W. Vestal, Removing State Constitution Badges of Inferiority, 22 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 4 (2019) (describing various lingering “archaic, ineffective, and unnecessary provisions in our
state constitutions” that violate Constitution).
Any hypothetical attempt to impose constraints through the state’s political process on
interpreting the Constitution would encounter obvious Supremacy Clause obstacles, see Mazzone,
supra note 9, at 1056, as well as potential state and federal constitutional law problems relating to the
independence of the judiciary.
94

95 See CAL. CONST. art. I § 7 (providing that nothing in state constitution imposes duties on
the government “which exceed those imposed by the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th
Amendment to the United States Constitution with respect to the use of pupil school assignment or
pupil transportation;” provision upheld against Equal Protection Clause challenge in Crawford v. Los
Angeles Bd. of Educ., 458 U.S. 527 (1982)); id. at art. I § 24 (“In criminal cases the rights of a
defendant to equal protection of the laws, to due process of law, to the assistance of counsel, to be
personally present with counsel, to a speedy and public trial, to compel the attendance of witnesses,
to confront the witnesses against him or her, to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, to
privacy, to not be compelled to be a witness against himself or herself, to not be placed twice in
jeopardy for the same offense, and to not suffer the imposition of cruel or unusual punishment, shall
be construed by the courts of this State in a manner consistent with the Constitution of the United
States. This Constitution shall not be construed by the courts to afford greater rights to criminal
defendants than those afforded by the Constitution of the United States, nor shall it be construed to
afford greater rights to minors in juvenile proceedings on criminal causes than those afforded by the
Constitution of the United States.”); FLA. CONST. art. I § 12 (providing that protections against
unreasonable searches, seizures, and interceptions of private communications and corresponding
exclusionary rules, “shall be construed in conformity with the 4th Amendment to the United States
Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court”); id. at art I § 17 (providing that
state prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments “shall be construed in conformity with decisions
of the United States Supreme Court which interpret the prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment provided in the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution”); LA. CONST. art. I
§ 4(G) (providing that with certain exceptions compensation for takings “shall not exceed the
compensation required by the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States of
America”); Mazzone, supra note 9, at 1055–56.
96 See Levinson, supra note 4, at 802–04 (summarizing state judicial selection and retention
mechanisms).
97 See Kansas v. Carr, 577 U.S. 108, 118 (2016). For example, in its ruling, discussed supra
note 84, that the Constitution required that an indigent be permitted to take an appeal of an adverse
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the general cultural respect for the commands of the Constitution.98 Because so
many more cases are denied review by the Supreme Court than are granted it,99 the
statistical odds are that a state court which wishes to achieve those goals will
succeed.100
To be sure, if a number of state courts have agreed with the expansion of a
federal constitutional right and the Supreme Court later disagrees, those state
courts may have to reconsider their views. But that is already the case and has not
resulted in any notable practical problems.101
B. Illustrative Modern Cases
1. State Innovations Resulting in Expeditious Supreme Court Response
The cases of least interest for present purposes are ones in which the Supreme
Court promptly confirms or rejects the state court’s view. In those cases, there will
not be an extended period during which the state courts have an unusual
interpretation of the federal constitution in place and need to confront the
retroactivity issue on state post-conviction.
An example is Simmons v. Roper.102 Two Supreme Court cases decided in
1989 had established that juveniles aged 16 and above were eligible for
execution.103 But in 2003, Simmons persuaded the Missouri Supreme Court that
ruling in a state habeas corpus action without posting bond, the Oregon Supreme Court stated several
times in the course of a short opinion that its decision was “forced, not by our own reasoning but by
the necessary implications of the decision of the United States Supreme Court” in Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U.S. 12 (1956). See Barber v. Gladden, 298 P.2d 986, 989–90 (Ore. 1956).
98 See Mazzone, supra note 9, at 1063. See also Rogers, supra note 92, at 572 (observing that
“the parties and the general public may have more confidence in a rule that is subject to correction by
the Supreme Court.”).
99 See SHAPIRO et al., supra note 19, ch. 1.20(b); Rogers, supra note 92, at 572 & 572 n. 167
(commenting that small percentage of cases reviewed by Court means that state supreme court
rulings on federal constitutional rights “may not come before the Court for years . . . if ever”); see
also supra text accompanying note 83 (noting that government may choose not to seek Supreme
Court review of decision expanding defendants’ federal constitutional rights).
100

Thus, for example, the decision in Barber was never reviewed by the United States
Supreme Court. See supra note 84.
101

For example, prior to Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 576 (2003), a number of state supreme courts had ruled that their consensual
sodomy statutes violated the Constitution. See People v. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936, 938–41, 943 (N.Y.
1980).
102

Simmons v. Roper, 112 S W.3d 397 (Mo. 2003).

103 See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 362 (1989) (ruling executions of 16-year-olds
permissible under Eighth Amendment); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 816 (1989) (ruling
executions of 15-year-olds impermissible under Eighth Amendment).

2021

THE SUBSTANCE OF MONTGOMERY RETROACTIVITY

657

the landscape had been altered by an intervening Supreme Court death penalty
case104 and that the Eighth Amendment line should now be drawn at the age of
18.105 The Supreme Court granted the state’s certiorari petition and in a 2005
decision affirmed the ruling of the Missouri Supreme Court.106 Thus Missouri was
no longer uniquely generous in its interpretation of the Eighth Amendment, as it
would have been if the Court had denied certiorari.
More recently, faced with confusion as to the meaning of Miller v. Alabama’s
ban on mandatory sentences of life without parole for juveniles107 in the wake of
Montgomery,108 the Supreme Court has signaled its intention to resolve that issue
in the October 2020 Term.109
2. State Innovations Resulting in Delayed Supreme Court Response
In some cases, there has been a substantial delay before state court rulings
expanding the federal constitutional rights of criminal defendants beyond the limits
of contemporary Supreme Court jurisprudence have received the Court’s
endorsement.
For example in a 1968 case the California Supreme Court granted state habeas
corpus relief vacating the convictions of a topless dancer and a nightclub manager
for lewd exposure and dissolute conduct based on an erotic dance performance at
the club.110 “Although the United States Supreme Court ha[d] not ruled on whether
the performance of a dance is potentially a form of expression protected against
104 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318–19 (2002) (holding mentally retarded persons
exempt from execution under Eighth Amendment).
105

See Simmons, 112 S.W. 3d at 399–400.

106

See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).

107 See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (holding such sentences violate Eighth
Amendment).
108 See Alice Reichman Hoesterey, Confusion in Montgomery’s Wake: State Responses, the
Mandates of Montgomery, and Why a Complete Categorical Ban on Life Without Parole for
Juveniles is the Only Constitutional Option, 45 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 149 (2017).
109

On March 9, 2020, the Supreme Court granted the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari in Jones
v. Mississippi, No. 18-1259, which was predicated on conflicting interpretations by the lower courts
of Montgomery’s restatement of the Miller rule. See id. at 9–14. For an overview of problems that
have divided the lower courts, see Zachary Crawford-Pechukas, Note, Sentence for the Damned:
Using Atkins to Understand the “Irreparable Corruption” Standard for Juvenile Life Without
Parole, 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2147, 2184–91 (2018). For a discussion of still-emerging problems
in the area and possible solutions, see Mary Marshall, Note, Miller v. Alabama and the Problem of
Prediction, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 1633 (2019).
110 In re Giannini, 466 P.2d 535 (Cal. 1968) (Tobriner, J.), cert. denied sub nom. California v.
Giannini, 395 U.S. 910 (1969).
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state intrusion by the guarantees of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the
federal Constitution,” the California court determined that it was.111 Thirteen years
later, in Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim,112 the United States Supreme Court,
upholding a challenge brought by an establishment which allowed customers to
view nude dancers in glass booths, endorsed this view: “as the state courts in this
case recognized, nude dancing is not without its First Amendment protections from
official regulation.”113
In another instance, in United States v. Matlock114 the Court determined in
1974 that where two people had joint control over a physical space one of them
could give consent to a police search in the absence of the other, who could not
later seek to contest the search when its fruits were offered in evidence against her
at a criminal trial. This left undecided the issue of whose views controlled if the
second person were present and objected to the search. Between 1977 and 1992
three isolated state supreme courts determined, against the great weight of state
and federal authority,115 that under the Fourth Amendment there was no effective
consent in that situation.116 In 2004 the Georgia Supreme Court agreed.117 The
United States Supreme Court granted the state’s certiorari petition and in 2006
affirmed the ruling in favor of the criminal defendant.118

111 Id. at 538. Hence, the court concluded, the convictions before it could not stand because the
constitutional requirements for the suppression of obscenity had not been met. Id. at 538–41.
112

Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981).

113 Id. at 66. In Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991), the Court eventually reaffirmed this conclusion, see id. at 565 (“[N]ude dancing . . . is expressive conduct within the outer
perimeters of the First Amendment”), while adopting a far more government-friendly test on the
merits than Giannini had. See also City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000) (concluding that
Pennsylvania Supreme Court had erred in distinguishing Barnes and upholding a First Amendment
challenge by a nude dancing establishment to a ban on public nudity). For a thoughtful but
unsuccessful attempt to persuade the Supreme Court to reform the relevant First Amendment
doctrine, see Jeffrey S. Raskin, Comment, Dancing on the Outer Perimeters: The Supreme Court's
Precarious Protection of Expressive Conduct, 33 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 395, 432–36 (1993).
114

United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974).

115

See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, at 7–8, Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006) (No.
04-1067), 2005 WL 309364 (collecting authority). See also Randolph, 547 U.S. at 109 n.1
(acknowledging status of issue in lower courts).
116 See Silva v. State, 344 So. 2d 559 (Fla. 1977); In re D.A.G., 484 N.W.2d 787 (Minn.
1992); State v. Leach, 782 P.2d 1035 (Wash. 1989).
117

See State v. Randolph, 604 S.E.2d 835 (Ga. 2004).

118

See Randolph, supra note 115.
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3. State Innovations Currently Without Supreme Court Response
As this is written, the Justices have yet to be heard from regarding several
areas in which state supreme courts have recognized broader federal constitutional
rights for criminal defendants than provided in existing Supreme Court caselaw.
In 2016 the Court held in Hurst v. Florida,119 that Florida’s death penalty
system was invalid under the Sixth Amendment because the jury was not required
to make factual findings of the aggravating factors supporting the death sentence.
On remand, the Florida Supreme Court held in Hurst v. State that the Sixth and
Eighth Amendments imposed several additional requirements, including a jury
determination that the balance of aggravating and mitigating factors warranted a
death sentence and that the jury decision be unanimous.120 Florida filed a petition
for certiorari asserting that these requirements extended defendants’ rights under
those Amendments beyond the limits of the Court’s existing jurisprudence.121 The
petition was denied,122 leaving Hurst v. State as the binding law in Florida on the
federal constitutional issues.
Continuing efforts to implement Batson v. Kentucky,123 the leading case on
the permissibility of peremptory jury challenges under the Equal Protection Clause
have generated a number of issues currently splitting state supreme courts124 as
well as some rulings pushing the boundaries of existing law. But the Supreme
Court has not intervened. Thus, for example, there was no Court response when in
119 Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016). For a discussion of the case and some of its
implications, see Maria T. Kolar, “Finding” a Way to Complete the Ring of Capital Jury Sentencing,
95 DENV. L. REV. 671, 712–24 (2018).
120 Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016). There is a further discussion of this case infra text
accompanying notes 159–63. More recently, the Florida Supreme Court has modified its views on the
constitutional issues so as to significantly constrict the requirements for jury decision-making. See
State v. Poole, 297 So. 3d 487 (Fla. 2020). It has, however, left unchanged the retroactivity
framework described infra text accompanying note 163. See Brown v. State, No. SC19-704, 2020
WL 5048548 at *24 & n.16 (Fla. Aug. 27, 2020).
121

See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, at 18–33, Florida v. Hurst, No. 16-998, 2017 WL
656209 (filed Feb. 13, 2017).
122

See Florida v. Hurst, 137 S. Ct. 2161 (2017).

123 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). For a full discussion of the origins and evolution
of Batson, see Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228, 2240–45 (2019). The three steps of a Batson
challenge are reiterated in id. at 2241, 2243.
124

See, e.g., People v. Williams, 299 P.3d 1185, 1242–54 (Cal. 2013) (Liu, J., dissenting)
(overviewing conflicting caselaw regarding standard of appellate review applicable to a trial court’s
determination regarding the third step of the Batson inquiry), cert. denied, Williams v. California,
571 U.S. 1197 (2014). For additional examples, see Semel, supra note 85, at 317–18 & 318 n.5
(determining whether prosecutorial explanation for strike is race-based), 359–60 (assessing strike
made for mix of valid and invalid reasons).
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2017 the Washington Supreme Court adopted a unique “bright line rule” under
which “the peremptory strike of a juror who is the only member of a cognizable
racial group on a jury constitutes a prima facia showing of racial motivation,”125
sufficient to satisfy the first of the three requirements imposed by Batson for a
successful Equal Protection Clause challenge.126
4. State Innovations on the Horizon
Identifying examples of state innovations that may emerge over the next
several years is not difficult.
In Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado,127 the Supreme Court held that a state court
evidentiary rule protecting secrecy of jury deliberations violated the Sixth
Amendment to the extent that it prevented a criminal defendant from putting
forward post-conviction evidence that the jury’s consideration of his case had been
infected by racism. In Rhines v. Young, a capital defendant brought a federal
habeas corpus petition asserting that the same rule should apply to anti-gay bias.128
Although his effort foundered on procedural shoals and the Supreme Court denied
review,129 it is entirely plausible that a state supreme court might soon accept the
claim.130
125 City of Seattle v. Erickson, 398 P.3d 1124, 1132 (Wash. 2017) (en banc). See Semel, supra
note 85, at 280–81, 295–96 (discussing case).
126 The Washington Supreme Court subsequently adopted WASH SUP. CT. GEN. RULE 37 (e)—
(i), which lay out a series of evidentiary rules “to eliminate the unfair exclusion of potential jurors
based on race or ethnicity,” id. at 37(a). See Semel, supra note 85, at 281 (describing rules as
“replac[ing] the Batson inquiry with a more rigorous approach.”). If Washington courts in the future
read the rules as incorporating Erickson and rely on the former not the latter in applying the “bright
line rule,” described in text, there is little likelihood of United States Supreme Court review. See
supra text accompanying note 85.
127

Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017).

128 See Adam Liptak, For Justices’ Consideration: Did Jurors’ Biases Affect a Gay Man’s
Sentence?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2019, at A20.
129
130

Rhines v. Young, No. 18-8029, 2019 WL 826425 (U.S. Apr. 15, 2019).

See Jason Koffler, Note, Laboratories of Equal Justice: What State Experience Portends
for Expansion of the Pena-Rodriguez Exception Beyond Race, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1801, 1805,
1845–47 (2018) (predicting that “Courts are likely to . . . apply the Pena-Rodriguez exception to
biases beyond race” and supporting such expansion); id. at 1804 n.14 (collecting commentary to
same effect). See also Richard Lorren Jolly, The New Impartial Jury Mandate, 117 MICH. L. REV.
713, 719 (2019) (“[W]hile the Court is adamant that the Pena-Rodriguez holding is limited to racial
bias, it is unlikely the Court can identify a limiting principle to exclude biases against other classes.”)
(footnotes omitted); Sydney Melillo, Note, “Vegas Rule: Jury Deliberation Edition”: Should the
Sixth Amendment Exception for Alleged Racial Bias in Deliberations Extend to Gender?, 11 DREXEL.
L. REV. 705, 708–09 (2019) (arguing “that the Pena-Rodriguez exception . . . should be extended to
gender-motivated animus of jurors.”).
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Similarly, the lower age limit of 18 that the Supreme Court set for executions
in Roper v. Simmons,131 is now under sustained assault as advocates urge that the
8th Amendment line should be set at 21.132 Some state supreme court may well find
the attack meritorious before too long.
V. DEFINING “SUBSTANTIVE” UNDER MONTGOMERY
A. Introduction
We now return to the issue of defining “substantive” for Montgomery
purposes. Any rule that is substantive under Teague133 is substantive under
Montgomery. That is exactly what Montgomery held134 and its legal conclusion
was correct. But the proper frames of reference for Montgomery problems and
Teague problems are different.135 The conclusion that new substantive rules under
Teague are also new substantive rules under Montgomery is most soundly reached
by applying the definition of “substantive” set forth at the start of the next section
as the appropriate one for use in cases presenting Montgomery issues.136 That
definition necessarily embraces at a minimum rules that are substantive under the
Teague paradigm but is independent of, and in no way restricted to, rules within
that template.137
131

Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (discussed supra text accompanying notes 102–

06).
132

See John H. Blume, et. al., Death by Numbers: Why Evolving Standards Compel Extending
Roper’s Categorical Ban Against Executing Juveniles from 18 to 21, 98 TEXAS L. REV. (forthcoming
2019) (available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3341438).
133 As explained supra Part III.B, I disclaim any purpose to define what those rules might be.
Some of the rules that I classify in the next section as “substantive” under Montgomery may well be
so under Teague. That, however, is a Teague discussion, not a Montgomery one, and this article does
not engage in it.
134

See Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 731–32 (2016).

135

See supra Part III. For that reason, my discussion in the next section of various doctrines
that do or do not apply retroactively under a sound understanding of Montgomery carries no
implication regarding their status under Teague. This article is about Montgomery retroactivity, not
Teague retroactivity. See supra note 133.
136 My purpose is to define “substantive” not “new,” see supra text accompanying notes 57–
58. I assume for the sake of discussion that my various examples in the next section involve “new”
rules, although in many instances they may actually be just the application of old rules to new fact
patterns.
137 Suppose, for instance, Justice Scalia was correct when he said in his Montgomery dissent,
see supra text accompanying notes 35–38, (1) that the Court’s new rule was procedural under Teague
and (2) that its purpose was not primarily having “state and federal collateral-review
tribunals . . . engage in [the] silliness [of], probing the evidence of ‘incorrigibility’ that existed
decades ago,” but rather “eliminating life without parole for juvenile offenders.” Montgomery, 136 S.
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As we have seen thus far, Montgomery arose when a new federal
constitutional right had been recognized138 and a state post-conviction petitioner
then sought to vindicate it.139 The Court used the term “substantive” to capture the
sort of right that the Supremacy Clause requires a state to enforce retroactively
when it adjudicates collateral attacks on its convictions.140 The Supremacy Clause
context of Montgomery should be key to defining the term.141 The principle
guiding the formulation of Supremacy Clause doctrine has always been vindicating
federal public policy goals by insuring that states do not act in ways that frequently
and predictably defeat a federal right.142 Let us follow that lodestar.
B. The Definition
I propose: a new “substantive” rule of federal law that a state is required to
enforce retroactively in state post-conviction proceedings is one whose policy
underpinnings extend beyond enhancing the factual accuracy of particular
decisions. The remainder of this section applies that proposed definition to a
variety of illustrative fact patterns.
A straightforward example of a substantive rule of federal constitutional law
is the one against the admission into evidence of coerced confessions. Although
the rule may certainly tend to enhance factual accuracy, it is also significantly
grounded in other considerations.143 Hence, the rule is “substantive” under

Ct. at 744 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In that event, the rule announced by the majority would be (1)
procedural under Teague, but (2) substantive under the appropriate definition articulated at the
beginning of the next section of text, infra Part V.B.
138 Although the case arose under those circumstances, the analysis of this section is equally
applicable to rights flowing from federal statutes and treaties. See supra note 76. For example, the
last twenty years or so have seen significant litigation, some of it in the state post-conviction context,
in which litigants have asserted claims under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24,
1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, e.g., State v. Gutierrez, No. 74236, 2020 WL 7183533 (Nev. Dec. 4, 2020);
Torres v. Oklahoma, 120 P.3d 1184 (Okla. Crim. App. 2005). See Sandra Babcock, The Limits of
International Law: Efforts to Enforce Rulings of the International Court of Justice in U.S. Death
Penalty Cases, 62 SYRACUSE. 183, 189–93, 197 (2012).
139

See supra Part II.

140

See supra text accompanying notes 25–27.

141

See supra Part III.C.

142

See supra Part III.C.

143 See Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 540–42 (1961) (“To be sure, confessions cruelly
extorted may be . . . untrustworthy. But the constitutional principle of excluding confessions that are
not voluntary does not rest on this consideration.”); see generally Dean A. Strang, Inaccuracy and the
Involuntary Confession: Understanding Rogers v. Richmond Rightly, 110 J. CRIM L. & CRIMINOLOGY
69 (2020).
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Montgomery. The day after the rule was announced144 the Supremacy Clause
required a state postconviction court to entertain a claimed violation of it
notwithstanding any retroactivity barrier under state law.
Similar considerations apply to the decision in Randolph145 against the Fourth
Amendment validity of one-party search consents. The constitutional rule that was
announced there was not premised on considerations of accurate fact-finding (and
may in fact have run counter to them) but rather reflected the outcome of a
balancing between the government’s investigative interests and “an objecting
individual’s claim to security against the government’s intrusion into his dwelling
place.”146 Because the rule was therefore substantive for Montgomery purposes, the
states which had previously reached the same federal constitutional conclusion as
the Court147 were required to apply it retroactively in state post-conviction from the
moment they did, and all states were so required following the Court’s decision.
Confrontation Clause cases, on the other hand, should ordinarily not be
classified as substantive under Montgomery. Consider Williams v. Illinois,148 which
rejected a challenge under that Clause to testimony regarding an out-of-court
laboratory test. If the Supreme Court overruled the case tomorrow, that decision
would announce a new rule of federal constitutional law but not one that the
Supremacy Clause would require a state court to enforce in a subsequent state
post-conviction proceeding. The reason is that the fundamental public policy
behind the new rule would be the enhancement of factual accuracy in the
individual case.149
Rules adding new groups to the set whose exclusion from jury service violates
either the fair cross-section requirement of the Sixth Amendment150 or the Equal
144

Of course, that day was long before Rogers. See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285–
86 (1936) (citing Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 91 (1923)); see also FREEDMAN, supra note 62, at
70–71, 74–76, 79–80 (describing facts of Moore); Wesley M. Oliver, Prohibition’s Fourth
Amendment Confessions Rule, 17 OH. ST. J. CRIM. L. 445 (2020) (discussing legacy of Brown); see
generally Strang, supra note 143, at 77–81 (describing legal environment in period between Brown
and Rogers).
145

See Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006) (discussed supra text accompanying notes

117–18).
146

Id. at 115.

147

See supra note 116.

148

Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50 (2012). See Michael S. Pardo, Confrontation After Scalia
and Kennedy, 70 ALA. L. REV. 757, 769–72 (2019) (describing case).
See Williams, 567 U.S. at 119 (Kagan, J. dissenting) (explaining that “the Confrontation
Clause prescribes a particular method for determining” whether evidence introduced at trial to
support a conviction is reliable).
149

150 See, e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 528 (1975) (noting that “the selection of a petit
jury from a representative cross section of the community” is an essential component of the Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial and invalidating conviction returned by jury where statutory selection
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Protection Clause151 should be considered substantive for Montgomery purposes.
Although increasing the diversity of jurors surely increases the accuracy of their
factfinding, the public policy behind such new rules goes well beyond that.152 Two
system permitted women to serve only if they had previously filed a written declaration of desire to
do so). See also Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946) (exercising supervisory power over federal
courts and reversing verdict in civil case for violation of fair cross-section requirement where daily
wage-earners not called for service). See generally Nina Chernoff, Black to the Future: The State
Action Doctrine and the White Jury, 58 WASHBURN L.J. 103 (2019) (criticizing current fair crosssection doctrine as insufficiently strict against government).
151

Most of the recent activity in this area has been in the field of peremptory challenges after
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) overruled the crippling standards that had been imposed by
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965). Because Batson represented “an explicit and substantial
break with prior precedent,” the Court, applying its pre-Teague retroactivity doctrines respecting
federal habeas review, held in Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255, 258–59 (1986) that only defendants
whose cases had not yet become final on direct review would be able to invoke the new rule. For the
reasons already noted, see, e.g., supra text accompanying note 135, that decision and ones like it have
no bearing on the argument presented in this paragraph of text.
152 See Allen, 478 U.S. at 259 (“By serving a criminal defendant's interest in neutral jury
selection procedures, the rule in Batson may have some bearing on the truth-finding function of a
criminal trial. But the decision serves other values as well. Our holding ensures that States do not
discriminate against citizens who are summoned to sit in judgment against a member of their own
race and strengthens public confidence in the administration of justice. The rule in Batson, therefore,
was designed "to serve multiple ends," only the first of which may have some impact on truth
finding. See Brown v. Louisiana, 447 U.S. 323, 329 (1980).”); see also Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S.
Ct. 2228, 2242 (2019) (“By taking steps to eradicate racial discrimination from the jury selection
process, Batson sought to protect the rights of defendants and jurors, and to enhance public
confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice system.”); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500
U.S. 614, 628, 631 (1991) (“Racial bias mars the integrity of the judicial system and prevents the idea
of democratic government from becoming a reality . . . [and] cause[s] injury to the excused juror.”).
For a discussion of the importance of this rationale in the context of the Court’s extension of Batson
to the exclusion of women in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994), see Joanna L.
Grossman, Note, Women’s Jury Service: Right of Citizenship or Privilege of Difference, 46 STAN. L.
REV. 1115 (1994). For a summary of the Court’s expansions of Batson in the years after the case was
decided, see Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2243; Semel, supra note 85, at 252. See generally Mark E. Wojik,
Extending Batson to Peremptory Challenges of Jurors Based on Sexual Orientation and Gender
Identity, 40 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 1, 3 (2019) (arguing that Batson should be extended to “prohibit
excluding potential jurors based on their actual or perceived sexual orientation or gender identity”). A
recently-adopted California statute has enacted this and a number of other reforms as matters of state
law. See 2020 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 318 (A.B. 3070) (West) (prohibiting exclusions based, inter alia,
on “age, mental disability, physical disability, medical condition,[or] genetic information,” and
providing enforcement procedures). Discussing the fair cross-section requirement of the Sixth
Amendment, the Court noted in Taylor that the exclusion of women from the jury “may not in a
given case make an iota of difference.” 419 U.S. at 532. But, it ruled, the policy purpose of guarding
“against the exercise of arbitrary power” by prosecutors and “the professional or perhaps over
conditioned or biased response of a judge” is not served “if the jury pool is made up of only special
segments of the populace or if large, distinctive groups are excluded from the pool. Community
participation in the administration of the criminal law, moreover, is not only consistent with our
democratic heritage but is also critical to public confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice
system.” Id. at 530. Similarly, the Court in Thiel wrote that the exclusion did “violence to the
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simple, if slightly time-shifted, examples illustrate the Supremacy Clause
consequences of this conclusion. The day after the Court decided Strauder v. West
Virginia,153 the courts of that state became required to adjudicate the postconviction claims of state prisoners challenging their convictions on the ground
that non-Whites had been statutorily excluded from their juries.154 The day after
some state supreme court decides that the federal constitution prohibits religionbased peremptory challenges of jurors, the courts of that state will be required to
adjudicate the claims of any state prisoners challenging their convictions on the
ground that the prosecutor struck venire members on the basis of religion.155
Along the same lines, the actual new rule of Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado,156
that the Sixth Amendment grants a convicted defendant the right to inquire into
racial bias during juror deliberations, and a hypothetical new rule of a state
supreme court extending the principle to anti-gay bias157 are both “substantive”
under a proper reading of Montgomery. In ruling for Mr. Pena-Rodriguez, the
Court’s concern was not just the risk that an innocent man might have been
convicted but “ensur[ing] that our legal system remains capable of coming ever
closer to the promise of equal treatment under the law that is so central to a
functioning democracy.”158 Thus after the announcement of either rule
Montgomery requires that state post-conviction courts entertain claims of its
violation regardless of their own retroactivity doctrines.
The same reasoning applies to the decision of the Florida Supreme Court in
Hurst v. State.159 The court held that in a capital case the Sixth and Eight
Amendments require that a jury determine beyond a reasonable doubt and
democratic nature of the jury system,” 328 U.S. at 223, and the challenger need not show any
prejudicial effect on the outcome of his case. Id. at 225. For an overview of the many advantages of a
broadly inclusive jury in addition to more accurate factfinding, see Thomas Ward Frampton, For
Cause: Rethinking Racial Exclusion and the American Jury, 118 MICH. L. REV. 785, 821–38 (2020).
153

Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879) (invalidating as racially discriminatory a
statute limiting jury service to white males and reversing prisoner’s conviction). Almost a century
later Taylor repudiated the suggestion of Strauder and some subsequent cases that the gender
discrimination in the statute was permissible. See Taylor, 419 U.S. at 536 n.19.
154 Although Strauder assumed that the claim was only available to minority-race prisoners,
the Court eventually concluded otherwise. See Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972); see also Powers v.
Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991) (reaching same conclusion with respect to Batson claims).
155

For further discussion of this hypothetical, see infra Part VI.A.

156

Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017).

157

See supra text accompanying notes 128–30.

158

Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 868.

159 Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, sub nom. Florida v. Hurst, 137 S. Ct.
2161 (2017) (discussed supra text accompanying notes 119–22).
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unanimously that the balance of aggravating and mitigating factors warrant a death
sentence. The opinion explained that these rules not only increased reliability with
respect to each finding, but also served on a systemwide basis to limit the number
of death verdicts returned, thereby serving “to help narrow the class of murderers
subject to capital punishment.”160 Moreover, the unanimity requirement would
align Florida with the evolving standard of decency among the states and ensure
that its juries were performing their critical role of ensuring that capital sentences
reflected the moral consensus of the community.161 These policy bases demonstrate
that the rules of federal constitutional law announced in Hurst v. State are
“substantive” within the meaning of Montgomery.
As in the cases discussed so far, the necessary legal consequence of that
conclusion is that, notwithstanding any state law retroactivity doctrines, the courts
of Florida must entertain in state post-conviction proceedings claims by prisoners
that they were sentenced in violation of the rules announced in Hurst v. State.
“Where state collateral review proceedings permit prisoners to challenge the
lawfulness of their confinement, States cannot refuse to give retroactive effect to a
substantive constitutional right that determines the outcome of that challenge.”162
To date, however, Florida has indeed refused. Instead of entertaining state postconviction claims by all prisoners whose death sentences were returned in
violation of Hurst, it has formulated a retroactivity rule closing the courthouse
doors to all Death Row inmates whose direct appeals became final before a
specific date in 2002 when a relevant Supreme Court precedent was decided.163
Pace Justice Thomas, state retroactivity law is not “a matter about which the
Constitution has nothing to say.”164 What the Constitution says in its Supremacy
160

Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d. at 60.

161

Id. at 61–62.

162

Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 731–32 (2016).

163

See Asay v. State, 210 So. 3d 1, 22 (Fla. 2016). The relevant precedent is Ring v. Arizona,
536 U.S. 584 (2002). For a discussion of these developments, see Hannah L. Gorman & Margot
Ravenscroft, Hurricane Florida: The Hot and Cold Fronts of America’s Most Active Death Row, 51
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 937, 963–64, 975–76 (2020).
In contrast, once the Delaware Supreme Court, reading the requirements of Hurst v. Florida,
136 S. Ct. 616 (2016), much as the Florida Supreme Court did, invalidated the state’s death penalty
statute in Rauf v. State, 145 A.3d 430 (Del. 2016), the state courts replaced all existing death
sentences with ones of life imprisonment. See Esteban Parra, Delaware's Last Two Death Row
Inmates Resentenced to Life in Prison, DELAWARE ONLINE (Mar. 13, 2018, 5:00 PM),
https://www.delawareonline.com/story/news/local/2018/03/13/delawares-last-death-row-inmatesresentenced-life-prison-tuesday/407863002/.
164 Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 750 (Thomas, J., dissenting). This statement could hardly be
taken literally even if Justice Thomas were correct in his underlying premise that state postconviction review processes need not exist at all. There are any number of situations in which a state
is not required to offer a benefit but is subject to constitutional constraints if it does. See, e.g., Trinity
Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2021–25 (2017); Rosenberger v.
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Clause is that the state may not enforce in its courts any rule of state law that will
frequently and predictably interfere with vindication of a federal right.165 That was
the law long before Montgomery and still is.166 The new question created by
Montgomery is what federal rights are “substantive” for purposes of its holding.
Returning to that issue, a cluster of representational and autonomy rights of
criminal defendants should be considered “substantive” under an appropriate
reading of Montgomery. For instance, McCoy v. Louisiana167 held that the
petitioner’s Sixth Amendment rights had been violated when, over his vociferous
objections, his trial counsel conceded to the jury that McCoy was factually,
although not legally, guilty of the charges. The rationale for the decision was not
limited to considerations of factual accuracy but significantly grounded in
furthering “that respect for the individual which is the lifeblood of the law.”168
The Court wrote:
Violation of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment-secured autonomy ranks as
error of the kind our decisions have called “structural”; when present,
such an error is not subject to harmless-error review. See, e.g., McKaskle
Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 828–30 (1995); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.
Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 539–41 (1985); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 91 (1986); Southeastern
Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 555 (1975); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374
(1971). The Court has made this point quite explicitly about appellate stages of the criminal process.
See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 393, 400–05 (1985). Presumably Justice Thomas would think that
the Constitution had something to say about a state retroactivity rule that permitted White prisoners in
state post-conviction proceedings but not Black ones to claim the benefits of some favorable legal
development.
In this case, Florida’s retroactivity rule suffers from several constitutional defects beyond its
inconsistency with the Supremacy Clause encapsulated in the next sentence of text. As more fully
described in the unsuccessful Petition for Certiorari, Kelley v. Florida, 139 S. Ct. 112 (2018) (No.171603) (https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/17-160
3 .html), Florida’s partial retroactivity rule, whose practical effect is to deny new sentencing trials to
a class of defendants who would be least likely to be sentenced to death today, cannot be squared
with the requirements of either the Equal Protection Clause, see, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
535, 541 (1942) (applying “strict scrutiny” to state criminal law distinctions bearing on fundamental
rights and invalidating sterilization statute because “the law lays an unequal hand on those who have
committed intrinsically the same quality of offense”) or the Eighth Amendment, see, e.g., Godfrey v.
Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980) (“[I]f a State wishes to authorize capital punishment it has a
constitutional responsibility to tailor and apply its law in a manner that avoids the arbitrary and
capricious infliction of the death penalty.”).
165

See Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 141 (1988).

166

See supra Part III.C.

167

McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500 (2018).

168 Id. at 1507 (internal citations omitted). See State v. Horn, 251 So. 3d 1069, 1075 (La. 2018)
(“McCoy is broadly written and focuses on a defendant's autonomy to choose the objective of his
defense.”).
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[v. Wiggins,] 465 U.S. 168, 177 [1984] . . . (harmless-error analysis is
inapplicable to deprivations of the self-representation right, because
“[t]he right is either respected or denied; its deprivation cannot be
harmless”); United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U. S. 140,
150 . . . (2006) (choice of counsel is structural); Waller v. Georgia, 467
U. S. 39, 49-50 (1984) (public trial is structural) . . . . An error may be
ranked structural, we have explained, “if the right at issue is not designed
to protect the defendant from erroneous conviction but instead protects
some other interest,” such as “the fundamental legal principle that a
defendant must be allowed to make his own choices about the proper
way to protect his own liberty.”169
This suggests the likelihood that as a general matter new federal constitutional
rules of criminal law that are “structural” for harmless error purposes are
“substantive” for Montgomery purposes because the inapplicability of harmless
error analysis implies that such rules do not have as their principal concern the
likelihood that the contested proceeding reached the correct factual result.170
VI. THE POTENTIAL OF MONTGOMERY ENFORCEMENT IN STATE POST-CONVICTION
PROCEEDINGS FOR IMPROVING THE STRUCTURE OF CRIMINAL ADJUDICATION
A necessary consequence of Montgomery is that the number of state postconviction decisions will increase in light of the states’ new Supremacy Clause
obligation to hear claims based on new substantive rules of federal constitutional
law,171 both ones originating in the Supreme Court of the United States and ones
originating in their own court systems.172 The broader the definition of
“substantive” the more pronounced the effect will be. Enhancing the salience of
state post-conviction proceedings in the overall structure of criminal adjudication
would be desirable for two reasons.

169

McCoy, 138 S. Ct. at 1511 (internal citations omitted).

170

See generally Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993) (holding that where jury is
erroneously instructed on reasonable doubt reversal is automatic without consideration of whether the
trial evidence was actually sufficient for conviction under proper instructions); Elizabeth Earle Beske,
Backdoor Balancing and the Consequences of Legal Change, 94 WASH. L. REV. 645, 687–88 (2019)
(listing additional examples).
171

See supra text accompanying note 4.

172

See supra text accompanying notes 55–57.
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A. Enriching Systemwide Dialogue
As noted above,173 the sidelining of the lower federal courts as expositors of
constitutional law in the criminal area has impoverished the usual dialogue among
courts that, in accord with our common law tradition, ordinarily enriches
constitutional thinking before the Court pronounces a definitive legal rule.174 To
the extent that the voices of state courts are heard more often, the damage will be
mitigated.175
This is a structural benefit that is independent of whatever particular decisions
are reached, including decisions that a certain rule is not “substantive” within the
meaning of Montgomery or that, if it is, the prisoner is not entitled to prevail. For
example, suppose there is a holding by the Supreme Court of the United States or a
state supreme court that the federal constitution prohibits jury strikes on the basis
of religion. That would be a substantive rule under the framework set forth in Part
V.B above.176 Not surprisingly, I think a court should accept that framework and
reach the same conclusion. But legal discourse would be advanced if a court were
to write a reasoned explanation in support of some other paradigm or some other
conclusion.177 If, on whatever rationale, the new rule was classified as substantive,
then, under Montgomery, a state post-conviction court could not invoke state
173

See supra text accompanying notes 63–65.

See SHAPIRO et al., supra note 19, ch. 4.4(b) (discussing benefits of “percolation” of issues
through lower courts); Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Codes and the Arrangement of the Law, 5 AM. L.
REV. 1, 1 (1870) (“It is the merit of the common law that it decides the case first and determines the
principle afterwards . . . It is only after a series of determinations on the same subject-matter that it
becomes necessary to ‘reconcile the cases,’ as it is called, that is, by a true induction to state the
principle which has until then been obscurely felt.”); Harry W. Jones, Our Uncommon Common Law,
42 TENN. L. REV. 443, 445, 462 (1975) (observing that common-law methodology has pervaded
American constitutional law from its origins through modern times). During our early national
period, the establishment of the legitimacy of judicial review was intertwined with the establishment
of the legitimacy of judicial exposition of the law by common law methods. See ERIC M. FREEDMAN,
MAKING HABEAS WORK: A LEGAL HISTORY 98–101 (2018); see generally Graham Mayeda,
Uncommonly Common: The Nature of Common Law Judgment, 19 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 107, 123–24,
131 (2006) (arguing that legitimacy of common law flows from its methodology).
174

175 As a theoretical matter this benefit might at some point be outweighed by the costs to the
judicial system of having to deal with a burdensome influx of new claims but as a practical matter
there is little likelihood of reaching that point. Issues under Montgomery arise only after a court has
recognized a new substantive constitutional right in the field of criminal law, a fairly rare occurrence.
176
177

See supra text accompanying note 155.

I agree with Vázquez & Vladeck, supra note 7, at 958–59, that Montgomery entitles a state
prisoner to file a state post-conviction petition asserting that a newly-recognized federal
constitutional right is retroactive without any requirement of awaiting a Court decision to that effect.
As the discussion supra Parts III—V should make clear, the definition of “substantive” is a question
of federal constitutional law that a state court is both empowered and required to decide in the first
instance.
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retroactivity doctrines to foreclose a prisoner’s claim that her incarceration
followed a trial at which the rule was violated. But the prisoner might still lose on
the merits. For example, the post-conviction court might decide that the basis of
the challenged strikes of Muslim venire members had not been religion but recordbased doubts as to their ability to be impartial in a case where the defendant was
accused of dumping a truckload of pork bellies into a mosque.178 That ruling would
both give the prisoner her day in court and contribute to the growth of the law.179
B. Enhancing State Post-Conviction Processes
To the extent Montgomery results in more and more visible, state postconviction proceedings, it will augment the states’ motivation—already increasing
in recent years—to make those proceedings meaningful.
As effective federal habeas corpus review has withered, state post-conviction
courts have come under growing pressure to improve the quality of their
adjudicatory processes through such mechanisms as the provision of competent
counsel and robust discovery rights.180
The practical source of this pressure is that the constriction of federal habeas
corpus review has increasingly left the state courts as the only realistic opportunity
for the merits of post-conviction claims to be heard and injustices corrected.181
The doctrinal manifestations of this pressure appear at two levels: first, the
structural level and, second, individual case level.182
(1) The structural level. State post-conviction systems must provide due
process. Their failure to do so is subject to attack through a federal

178

This hypothetical is similar to the actual ruling in State v. Hodge, 726 A.2d 531, 549–54
(Conn. 1999) (cited supra note 85).
179

See Rogers, supra note 92, at 572–573 (commenting that Court will benefit from previous
analyses by state supreme courts when it considers federal constitutional issues).
180

See Kovarsky, supra note 41, at 444–45, 448–50.

181 See id. at 456–60; see also Am. Bar Ass’n, Guidelines for the Appointment and
Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 913, 935 (2003)
[hereinafter ABA Guidelines] (Commentary to Guideline 1.1) (“Because state collateral proceedings
may present the last opportunity to present new evidence to challenge the conviction, it is imperative
that counsel conduct a searching inquiry to assess whether any mistake may have been made.”). As a
matter of disclosure, I serve as Reporter to the ABA Guidelines. Id. at 915.
182 See Eric M. Freedman, Enforcing the ABA Guidelines in Capital State Post-Conviction
Proceedings After Martinez and Pinholster, 41 HOFSTRA L. REV. 591, 600 (2013); Shay, supra note
64, at 481.
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civil rights lawsuit.183
(2) The individual case level. When state prisoners seek federal habeas
corpus review of their convictions, the states (A) face the threat that
the outcomes of inadequate state post-conviction processes will not
survive, and (B) benefit from a promise that if those proceedings
have been fair the federal habeas courts will largely defer to their
outcomes.
A. Where a state post-conviction system exists, a state prisoner
must utilize it as a pre-condition to the grant of federal habeas
relief—unless it is unavailable or “ineffective to protect the rights
of the applicant.”184 An example of such a system is one that fails
to provide a fair hearing when relevant facts are in dispute.185
Similarly, a federal habeas corpus court is required to presume the
truth of the facts found by the state courts186—unless the petitioner
183

See Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 529, 532–34 (2011); Dist. Attorney’s Office for
Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 70, 73–75 (2009); Justin F. Marceau, Challenging the
Habeas Process Rather Than the Result, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 85 (2012).
184 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) (2020). See HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 11, § 23.4[a][ii] at 1325
n.22 (discussing provision); Eve Brensike Primus, Federal Review of State Criminal Convictions: A
Structural Approach to Adequacy Doctrine, 116 MICH. L. REV. 75 (2017) (providing detailed
roadmap of historical origins and potential litigation future of attacks on state post-conviction
processes as structurally inadequate to vindicate federal rights). See also Eve Brensike Primus,
Equitable Gateways: Toward Expanded Federal Habeas Corpus Review of State-Court Criminal
Convictions, 61 ARIZ. L. REV. 291, 307 (2019). See generally Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114, 118
(1944) (“[W]here resort to state court remedies has failed to afford a full and fair adjudication of the
federal contentions raised, either because the state affords no remedy or because in the particular case
the remedy afforded by state law proves in practice unavailable or seriously inadequate a federal
court should entertain his petition for habeas corpus, else he would be remediless.”) (citations
omitted).
185 See Smith v. Wyrick, 693 F.2d 808, 810 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1024
(1983). See also Eric M. Freedman, Fewer Risks, More Benefits: What Governments Gain by
Acknowledging the Right to Competent Counsel on State Post-Conviction Review in Capital Cases, 4
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 183, 189 (2006) (observing that a state post-conviction system that “cannot be
effectually employed without the assistance of a competent attorney” should meet § 2254(b)(1)’s
description); Eve Brensike Primus, Effective Trial Counsel After Martinez v. Ryan: Focusing on the
Adequacy of State Procedures, 122 YALE L.J. 2604 (2013) (making similar suggestion in wake of
Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012)). For an overview of the duties of counsel representing a state
post-conviction petitioner, see ABA Guidelines, supra note 181, at 932–35. These efforts to improve
the quality of state post-conviction representation are taking place against the backdrop of a federal
habeas corpus jurisprudence that very frequently refuses to reach the merits of constitutional claims
because of missteps by whatever counsel petitioners may have had during state post-conviction. More
often than not, “[w]hether an inmate obtains merits review is hugely sensitive to differences in
postconviction representation and barely sensitive at all to the quality of the underlying claim.” Lee
Kovarsky, The Habeas Optimist, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 101, 121 (2014).
186

See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(e)(1) (2020).
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has not been given a full and fair opportunity to develop the claim
there.187 This exception, long embodied in the statutory188 and
judge-made189 rules governing federal habeas corpus review, flows
from the very definition of “habeas corpus”190 and ultimately rests

187

See 1 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 11, ch. 7 (discussing this exception). See generally
William J. Brennan, Jr., Federal Habeas Corpus and State Prisoners: An Exercise in Federalism, 7
UTAH L. REV. 423, 441–42 (1961) (suggesting that to the extent states increased the robustness of
their post-conviction review processes, “intervention by any federal court . . . would become
unnecessary.”).
188 See Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 312 (1963) (holding state determinations of fact not
binding in federal habeas corpus proceeding if not based on “full and fair” factfinding procedures).
See also Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 10 (1992) (noting that the state “must afford the
petitioner a full and fair hearing on his federal claim” or else federal rehearing of the facts is
required).
The Court discussed this longstanding rule in Jefferson v. Upton, 560 U.S. 284, 292–94 (2010),
and ordered a remand for consideration of its applicability. The eventual result was that the Court of
Appeals, reviewing a District Court hearing into the procedures employed by the state postconviction
court, “agree[d] with the district court that the factual record compels the conclusion that Jefferson
did not receive a full and fair hearing in his state habeas proceeding[,]” and held “that the state
court’s factual findings were not entitled to a presumption of correctness.” See Jefferson v. GDCP
Warden, 941 F.3d 452, 476 (11th Cir. 2019). Hence, on federal habeas corpus petitioner needed only
prove his case by a preponderance of the evidence, see id. at 473.
For a complete discussion of the current statutory situation, see Justin F. Marceau, Don’t
Forget Due Process: The Path Not (Yet) Taken in § 2254 Habeas Corpus Adjudications, 62
HASTINGS L.J. 1, 57–64 (2011).
189

See Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 92 (1923) (holding that state post-conviction
processes were not “sufficient to allow a Judge of the United States to escape the duty of examining
the facts for himself”). This ruling seems to have reflected an acceptance of petitioner’s argument
that the facts had been determined at the state level on a motion for a new trial heard by the very
judge whose conduct was in question and whose decision could only be reviewed for legal error. See
FREEDMAN, supra note 62, at 80–81 (quoting Moore’s brief); see also id. at 87–88, 91, 199 n.7, 200 n.
10 (discussing predecessor cases of Frank v. Magnum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915) and Ex parte Bollman, 8
U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807)).
190
See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 773–92 (2008) (holding that power to conduct
inquiry into law and facts after assessing adequacy of prior proceedings is, along with power to order
release, the core of habeas); FREEDMAN, supra note 174, at 9–10, 20, 24–26 (discussing importance of
factfinding in habeas proceedings through the centuries); Eric M. Freedman, Habeas Corpus in Three
Dimensions—Dimension Three: Habeas Corpus as an Instrument of Checks and Balances, 8 NE. U.
L.J. 251, 303 n.264 (2016) (endorsing views of scholars who have noted that duty of factfinding
means that “in adjudicating habeas cases courts must employ procedural mechanisms, e.g., discovery,
that are sufficient for this purpose, regardless of whether those procedures existed at common law,
are made available by statute, or conform to the wishes of the jailers.”). See generally James H.
Brewer, Suspension Clause Interpretation and the Development of Postconviction Remedies in
Washington and Oregon, 54 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 495, 527 (2018) (considering applicability of
Boumediene to interpretation of state constitutional prohibitions on suspension of writ).
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upon the Constitution.191
B. On the other hand, AEDPA contains various limitations on the
federal courts’ authority to grant the writ to state prisoners,
including the provision of 28 U.S.C.§ 2254(d)(1) that “with
respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State
court proceedings”192 the writ shall not be granted unless that
adjudication “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States.”193 Construing this provision as a threshold barrier to factfinding by the District Court, Cullen v. Pinholster held that in
determining whether petitioner has met AEDPA’s legal standard
the federal habeas court must confine itself at the outset to a
consideration of the record that the state courts had before them.194
Thus if the states conform to the requirements discussed in
Paragraph 2 (A) and “create robust processes for post-conviction
review, the federal courts will under Pinholster treat their
individual outcomes with greater respect than before.”195 The
prospect of an uptick in the number of state post-conviction
proceedings as a result of Montgomery is yet another reason why
states should respond positively to the converging pressures to
improve the quality of those proceedings, an outcome that would
benefit the whole criminal justice system.

191 See Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 948–54 (2007) (refusing to defer to state courts’
factual finding that petitioner was mentally competent because their fact-finding process was
inadequate); Pennsylvania ex rel Herman v. Claudy, 350 U.S. 116, 118-19, 123 (1956) (reversing
state Supreme Court for summarily denying habeas petition on merits simply based on respondent’s
denial and without providing evidentiary hearing); Liebman & Ryan, supra note 10, at 835–36
(discussing Article III): Marceau, supra note 188, at 7 (discussing due process); Samuel R. Wiseman,
Habeas After Pinholster, 53 B.C.. 953, 992–99 (2012) (discussing Suspension Clause, U.S. Const.
art. I, § 9, cl. 2).
192 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d)(1) (1996). If this pre-condition does not apply, neither does the
remainder of the section. See Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 180–83, 187 (2011); Porter v.
McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 39 (2009); Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 472 (2009); Rompilla v. Beard, 545
U.S. 374, 380 (2005); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 534 (2003); Rodney v. Filson, 916 F.3d 1254,
1261–62 (9th Cir. 2019).
193

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2017).

194

See Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 183.

195 Freedman, supra note 182, at 600. See generally Lee Kovarsky, Preclusion and Criminal
Judgment, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 637, 671 (2016) (observing that in cases where Pinholster applies
its effect is “to form an almost insurmountable § 2254(d) hurdle.”).
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VII. CONCLUSION
Formulating an appropriate definition of “substantive” for Montgomery
purposes is not just a narrow doctrinal project. The case arose in the context of a
noxious current problem in criminal law adjudication, namely the set of issues that
has arisen as the Justices have struggled over the forty years since Teague to create
sound rules for administering post-conviction attacks on state convictions. If read
appropriately, Montgomery represents an opportunity to advance towards a
solution by employing some old but recently-unmined resources—legal resources
from a vein of Supremacy Clause law that might enable the reframing of thinking
about the retroactivity of new rules of federal law, and practical resources from
reinvigorated decision making by state post-conviction courts.
In the interests of making modest but real improvements in the quality of our
criminal law, lawyers, legislators, academics, judges, and all individuals concerned
about justice should take full advantage of every opportunity to secure adoption of
the proposal of this article: “Substantive” new rules of federal law under
Montgomery include all those whose policy underpinnings extend beyond
enhancing
the
factual
accuracy
of
particular
decisions.

